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MAKING CIVIL IMMIGRATION DETENTION
"CIVIL," AND





In 2009, the Obama Administration began to reform its sprawling immi-
gration detention system by asking the question, "How do we make civil
detention civil?" Five years later, after opening an explicitly-named "civil
detention center" in Texas to public criticism from both sides, the Admin-
istration's efforts have stalled. But its reforms, even if fully implemented,
would still resemble lower-security criminal jails.
This symposium article is the first to comprehensively examine the Ad-
ministration's efforts to implement "truly civil" immigration detention,
through new standards, improved conditions, and greater oversight. It does
so by undertaking the first descriptive comparison of the U.S.'s two largest
civil detention systems-immigration detention and sex offender civil
commitment-to ascertain the value of the "civil" label of detention re-
form. It finds the emerging civil detention paradigm to be an incarcerative
model presuming round-the-clock confinement but with lower security, as
well as increasing, near-criminal procedural protections. Thus, the "civil"
label of reform has little meaning, either to the individual's deprivation of
liberty or the expressive message communicated. More meaningful and
more "civil" reform would be to implement a system that detains less, not
American Immigration Council, Enforcement Fellow. J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Boston Col-
lege. I thank Michael Cahill, Stacy Caplow, Maryellen Fullerton, Robert Koulish, Barbara Moses, John
Pollock, Brian Soucek, Maunica Sthanki, and Robert Weisberg for their guidance. Additionally, I thank
the members of the 2012 Immigration Law Teachers' Workshop at Hofstra University School of Law
(particularly Farin Anello, Melynda Barnhart, Jason Cade, Linus Chan, Nora Demleitner, C6sar
Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernfindez, Anil Kalhan, Maria Pab6n L6pez, Beth Lyon, Rebecca Sharpless, Juliet
Stumpf, Margaret Taylor, and Elizabeth Young). Lastly, I thank Setenay Akdag, Leslie Bailey, Kelsey
Bilodeau, Margaret Garrett, Julia Kahlig, Liz Komar, Becky McBride, August Pozgay, Tobias Schad,
and Svetlana Turova for tireless research assistance.
534 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:3
just better. Looking forward, I offer a prescriptive framework for a civil
detention system-one that detains far less frequently, for shorter periods,
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Introduction
In 2009, in the Obama Administration's infancy, new Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") Secretary Janet Napolitano hired Dr. Dora
Schriro, then head of Arizona's corrections system, to perform a "compre-
hensive and candid" review of DHS' enormous immigration detention sys-
tem.I The Administration envisioned this review to be its first step towards
reforming immigration detention into a "truly civil detention system," as
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") director John Morton stat-
ed.2 Thus, Dr. Schriro saw her central question, as she later put it, to be
"How do we make civil detention civil?" 3
Dr. Schriro issued her report in October 2009 after touring immigration
detention facilities around the country. She described the "largest detention
system in the country," then detaining over 378,000 individuals a year and
over 31,000 per day, mainly in jails and prisons.4 She recommended the
creation of a detention model tailored to the immigrant population, gov-
erned by different standards than criminal incarceration, with robust over-
sight and transparency. 5 Subsequently, in the next three years, ICE devel-
oped new (albeit still legally non-binding) detention standards to govern
this new civil detention model, 6 and hired detention monitors to enforce it.7
In March 2012, ICE then opened what it called "the most tangible evi-
1 University of Florida Center for Latin American Studies, Loyola University Conference: Impris-
oned, Forgotten, and Deported: Immigration Detention, Advocacy, and the Faith Community at 1:59-
2:48 (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-37lnDqyjrSo&feature=youtu.be (focusing on
speech by Dr. Dora Schriro, then-Commissioner of the NYC Department of Corrections).
2 Nina Bernstein, U.S. to Reform Policy on Detention for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/us/politics/06detain.html.
3 University of Florida Center for Latin American Studies, supra note 1, at 3:11-3:15.
4 DR. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS at 4, 6
(2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [hereinafter
Schriro Report]. This is greater than the number of persons handled by the Federal Bureau of Prisons or
3 University of Florida Center for Latin American Studies, supra note 1, at 3:11-3:15.
4 DR. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS at 4, 6
(2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [hereinafter
Schriro Report]. This is greater than the number of persons handled by the Federal Bureau of Prisons or
any state's prison system in a year. See Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Crimi-
nal Inmates and Immigrant Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1446 (2010) [hereinafter Improving
Conditions]; Cdsar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hemrindez, The Perverse Logic Of Immigration Detention: Un-
raveling The Rationality Of Imprisoning Immigrants Based On Markers Of Race And Class Otherness,
1 COL. J. RACE & L. 353, 357 & n. 16 (2012).
5 Schriro report at 5.
6 See generally U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PERFORMANCE BASED
NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
standards/201 1/pbnds201 I.pdf [hereinafter PBNDS].
7 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DETENTION REFORM ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
available at http://www.ice.gov/detention-reform/detention-reform.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
2014]
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dence" of reform - the first explicitly named "civil detention" facility.8
The Karnes County Civil Detention Center in Texas provides detainees
with freedom of movement within its 29 acres, semi-private bathrooms, ini-
tial medical screening upon arrival at a centralized medical center, family
visits with meaningful contact, and programs and resources such as a li-
brary, computers with Internet, a gym, a soccer pitch, and basketball and
volleyball courts. Guards are called "resident advisers" and wear blue polo
shirts and khaki trousers. 9 ICE planned its future to look like Karnes. It
concurrently planned four other civil facilities like it, to house in total
4,622 detainees (14% of U.S. detainees) in these conditions it called "non-
penal."10 The bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom subsequently recommended that all immigration facilities "repli-
cate the physical structure of Karnes," in its "Best Practices" for detention
of asylum seekers. 11
Human rights groups also called the Karnes facility a "step forward,"
with good reason. 12 U.S. immigration detention facilities have been widely
criticized for violating international human rights standards for their treat-
ment of civil detainees with criminal incarceration methods, such as prison
uniforms, shackles, strip-searches and solitary confinement, as well as un-
sanitary conditions, inadequate medical screenings and treatment, and
widespread physical, verbal, and sexual abuse, often in response to detain-
ees' assertion of rights.13 All these violations have occurred without pro-
8 Kirk Semple & Tim Eaton, Detention for Immigrants That Looks Less Like Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20l2/03/14/us/model-immigration-detention-
center-unveiled-in-texas.html (quoting Gary Mead, ICE director for Enforcement and Removal Opera-
tions).
9 Indeed, a N.Y. Times photo - albeit taken through a chain link fence - showed a gym that looked
much like a hotel's. See Ben Sklar, Slideshow: A Model Immigration Detention Center, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2012/03/14/us/IMMIG-2.html.
10 RuTHiE EPSTEIN & ELEANOR ACER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS:
TRANSFORMING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM-A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 18-20 (2011),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf; CODY
MASON, DOLLARS AND DETAINEES: THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION 6 (2012),
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incDollars and Detainees.pdf.
11 U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ASSESSING THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT'S DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: FURTHER ACTION NEEDED TO FULLY IMPLEMENT
REFORMS 4 (2013) [hereinafter USCIRF 2013], available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/ERS-
detention%20reforms%20reporto2OApril%202013.pdf.
12 See, e.g., Silky Shah, Karnes County Civil Detention Center: A Step in the Right Direction, But
Better Options Exist @ LIRSorg, DET. WATCH NETWORK (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://detentionwatchnetwork.wordpress.com/2012/03/15/kames-detention-center-a-step-in-the-right-
direction-but-better-options-exist-lirsorg/ (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service press release).
13 See, e.g., FRANCOIS CRtPEAU, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS 7-8 (2012), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session2O/A-HRC-20-
24_en.pdf; NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION: THE USE OF
SEGREGATION AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2012), available at
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cedural protections that criminal defendants receive, such as appointed
counsel, making immigration detention in many ways the worst of both the
civil and criminal worlds. 14 Meanwhile, DHS' use of detention has grown
even further, to a record 477,523 detainees in fiscal year 2012 and 34,000
or more on any one day15-the "invisible civil rights issue of our time," as
Juliet Stumpf called it.16 DHS' civil detention reform initiatives have been
the U.S. government's primary response.
In 2014, though, five years after Dr. Schriro's report, her question "How
do we make civil detention civil?" remains largely unanswered. In this
symposium Article, I offer the first comprehensive assessment of the Ad-
ministration's reforms towards a "truly civil" detention system. Scholars
have examined the conflation between civil and criminal legal frame-
works, 17 particularly as to immigration law, 18 and specifically as to its en-
forcement. 19 Scholars have also begun to examine immigration detention,
noting the structural similarities between immigration detention and crimi-
nal pretrial detention,20 criticizing the "unmistakable penal reality" of cur-
rent detention conditions 21 and quantitative over-detention, 22 and arguing
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/publications/report-invisible-isolation-use-segregation-and-solitary-
confinement-immigration-detenti; INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 97-98 (2010) [hereinafter
"IACHR"], available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/migrants2011.pdf, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 29 (2009),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf.
14 See Improving Conditions, supra note 4, at 1445 ("...in general, criminal inmates fare better
than civil detainees.").
15 DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, 1
(2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois-enforcement-ar_2012-l.pdf; DHS OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, ICE'S RELEASE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINEES, 2 (2014), available at
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2014/OIG_14-116_Augl4.pdf. See generally Mark Noferi, Cen-
ter for Migration Studies, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: BEHIND THE RECORD NUMBERS (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://cmsny.org/immigration-detention-behind-the-record-numbers/.
16 Juliet Stumpf, Civilizing Civil Detention, JOTWELL (May 9, 2014), available at
http://lex'jotwell.com/rcivilizing-civil-detention.
17 See e.g. John C. Coffee, Paradigms Lost, The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992).
18 See e.g. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, And Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) ("Immigration
law today is clothed with so many attributes of criminal law that the line between them has grown indis-
tinct"); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why
HardLaws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1889, 1921 (2000).
19 See e.g. Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 1281, 1288 (2010) (de-
scribing "collaborative relationship" between criminal and immigration enforcement authorities that
"undermines the criminal-civil divide"); Allegra M. McLeod, The US. Criminal-Immigration Conver-
gence and its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012) [hereinafter McLeod].
20 See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 391 (2006); Steven H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, And
Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 537-39 (1999).
21 Cdsar Cuauht~moc Garcia Hernindez, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV.
538 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:3
that detention constitutes punishment under current legal frameworks.2 3
This article, however, is the first to consider recent civil immigration de-
tention reforms. I examine the substantive meaning of the civil label of de-
tention conditions reform (if any), either from the detainee's perspective, as
to the deprivation of liberty involved, or an expressive perspective, as to
the message conveyed.24 Notably too, I critique the future of immigration
detention more than its present, by focusing on DHS' new 2011 civil deten-
tion standards, and subsequent 2012 American Bar Association (ABA)
Model Civil Immigration Detention Standards, 25 so as to imagine and ex-
amine a world of fully-implemented civil immigration detention, as cur-
rently conceptualized.
Additionally, I undertake this inquiry by examining immigration deten-
tion within the broader context of U.S. civil detention. I do so through the
first descriptive comparison of DHS detention practices, and the procedures
attending them, to those employed in sexually violent predator ("SVP")
civil commitment, America's second-largest civil detention system. Alt-
hough immigration is the "behemoth" of U.S. noncriminal detention,26 over
5,000 sex offenders are currently adjudged dangerous and detained after
completing their criminal sentence. 27 SVP commitment is well-examined,
with most scholars having criticized its legal foundations, 28 but without ex-
1346, 1382 (2014) [hereinafter Hemnidez]; Maunica Sthanki, Deconstructing Detention: Structural
Impunity and the Need for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 451 (2013) (arguing that immi-
gration detention operates with entrenched structural impunity, and recommending external oversight).
22 Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2012) (providing institutional design recommendations regarding over-detention);
Hemdndez at 1406-09 (arguing to reassess the method used to detain, and move towards regime fo-
cused on supervised custody); Kalhan, infra note 24, at 58 (arguing for "a more fundamental reconsid-
eration of immigration control policies," less connected to criminal enforcement); see also Sarah Gryll,
Comment, Immigration Detention Reform: No Band-Aid Desired, 60 EMORY L.J. 1211, 1235 (2011).
23 Hemrndez at 1382 (2014) (arguing that immigration detention constitutes punishment, under
regulation versus punishment tests, given its legislative intent).
24 To date, Anil Kalhan's 2010 Essay has performed the most comprehensive analysis of detention
reform following Schriro's report. Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010). As Kalhan noted, ICE's reform proposals "target excessive conditions of
confinement but leave other excessive practices intact," such as over-detention. Id. at 44. Here, I build
upon Kalhan's observations, more specifically examine ICE's 2011 detention standards which followed
Kalhan's Essay, draw conclusions in the context of other civil detention schemes, and delineate a
framework for civil detention.
25 American Bar Association, ABA Civil Immigration Detention Standards, 1-85 (2012), available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/inmigration/abaimmdetstds.authcheckdam
.pdf [hereinafter "ABA Standards"].
26 Adam Klein and Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2
HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 85, 145-52 (2011) [hereinafter Klein & Wittes].
27 See infra Section III.A.
28 See, e.g., Klein & Wittes, at 164-169; David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention,
Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 701 (2009) [hereinafter Cole, Shadows]; Stephen
Morse, Preventive Detention, Mental Disorder And Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
885 (2011); Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 CONN. L. REV.
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amining its conditions. Nor have scholars who have surveyed the legal
frameworks for immigration detention and SVP commitment focused on
their conditions.2 9 This descriptive comparison facilitates examination of
the value and impact of terming detention reforms "civil." After all, alt-
hough criminal pretrial detention is also legally civil, 30 criminal pretrial de-
tention reforms are not billed as "civil detention reform." 3 1
In examining this emerging civil detention paradigm, two major descrip-
tive trends emerge: (1) constant confinement, but with improved, lower-
security conditions and greater programmatic offerings, and (2) stronger
procedural protections than in ordinary civil proceedings, approaching
those in criminal proceedings. 32 But the emerging civil paradigm still most
resembles criminal incarceration.
First, the new civil detention paradigm is still incarcerative-employing
round-the-clock confinement of detainees in closed facilities 33-albeit
marked by separate, improved, and less restrictive conditions of confine-
ment for civil detainees, with greater programmatic offerings and re-
sources. That said, the goal of incapacitation dominates where in tension
with the unique needs of a civil population (e.g. family ties, litigating pend-
ing proceedings, or treatment). Given this, I argue that less restrictive con-
ditions inside the walls do not meaningfully distinguish civil detention
from lower-security criminal incarceration, in terms of the deprivation of
liberty imposed upon detainees, 34 with its impacts on work, family, mental
161 (2011); Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators- Continued Incarceration at
What Cost, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213 (2011); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on
Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2010); Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders Unlaw-
ful Combatants And Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2005); Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora's
Box- Sexual Predators and the Politics of Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233 (2004); Peter
C. Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States' Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of
Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REr. 2229 (2003); David J. Gottlieb, Essay, Preventive Detention of Sex
Offenders, 50 KAN. L. REV. 1031 (2002); Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the Future of Sex Offender
Commitment Laws, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515 (1998).
29 See Klein & Wittes, supra note 17 at 99-100; Cole, Shadows at 703.
30 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
31 See Henry Joel Simmons, Right on Crime, Saving Money by Reforming Pretrial Detention
(June 3, 2011), http://www.rightoncrime.com/2011/06/saving-money-by-reforming-pretrial-detention/;
Pretrial Justice Institute, http://www.pretrial.org/.
32 Judith Resnik, Detention, The War On Terror, And The Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
579, 659 (2010) (regarding immigration detention, "the administrative proposals for improvement
[have] continued to rely on the model of detention, albeit with better facilities, and the judicial respons-
es have insisted, despite legislative obstacles, on some procedural protections for detained aliens.").
33 Although the word "detention" is commonly used in connection with civil laws and "incarcera-
tion" in connection with criminal laws, I treat the two terms as functionally equivalent here. I define
them both as Michael Flynn does: the physical restraint of a person against their will in a confined
space for some amount of time. See MICHAEL FLYNN, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, WORKING PAPER
NO. 4 IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND PROPORTIONALITY 7-9 (2011), available at
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/publications/GDP-detentionand__proportionalitywor
kingpaper.pdf.
34 Rinai Kitai-Sangero, The Limits of Preventive Detention, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 903, 917
2014]
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health, and the ability to attend to proceedings. 35 Indeed, research shows
that indefinite detention may cause greater psychological harm than crimi-
nal incarceration, even with less restrictive conditions. 36 Nor do less re-
strictive conditions inside the walls change the expressive message of de-
tention as connoting criminality.37 Put more simply, Adam Gopnik wrote,
"[T]he thing about jail is that there are bars on the windows and they won't
let you out. This simple truth governs all the others." 3 8 Removing the bars
and barbed wire does not make detention "civil."
Secondly, the new civil detention paradigm is marked by stronger proce-
dural protections, approaching those given to criminal defendants. 39 SVP
committees possess procedural safeguards such as a higher burden to de-
tain, a requirement to appoint counsel, oversight from individualized and
appellate review, and even jury trials. 40 Concomitantly, procedural protec-
tions such as appointed counsel and bond hearing oversight are advancing
for immigration detainees through the courts, legislation, and local initia-
tives, such that one can envision a future where immigration detainees are
granted at least some of the procedural protections granted to SVP commit-
tees.4 1 But again, additional criminal-like procedural safeguards implicitly
but expressively confirm that the deprivation of liberty at stake resembles
criminal incarceration.4 2 And without concomitant substantive reforms to
laws causing the high incidence of detention, it is plausible that immigra-
(2009) ("Detainees and convicted prisoners are harmed to the same extent by a denial of their free-
dom.").
35 Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Ap-
proaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986) (summarizing collateral impacts of deten-
tion besides time and liberty). See infra Section II.A.2.
36 See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
37 See infra Section IV.A.
38 Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat-atlargegopnik#ixzz2A5DhOeO
Z.
39 Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 186-89 (summarizing growing trend that preventive detention
authorities provide adequate procedural due process).
40 See infra Section III.
41 See infra Section II.C.
42 1 and others have argued for increased procedural protections to immigrant detainees. See, e.g.,
Mark Noferi, Deportation Without Representation, SLATE, May 15, 2013, available at
http://www.slate.com/artices/news-and-politics/Jurisprudence/2013/05/the-immigration bill should-i
nclude the right to a lawyer.html; Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right To
Appointed Counsel For Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 63, 63 (2012); Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: The Need for Procedural Reform
in "Joseph " Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 51 (2006); Harvey Gee, Placing
Limitations on the Government's Indefinite Detention of Immigration Detainees After Rodriguez, 17
GONZ. J. INT'L L. 1 (2014). In this article, though, I largely assume those procedural arguments will
advance over time as happened in the U.S. criminal system, see Noferi, 18 Mich. J. Race & L. at 108-
09, and critique a future of immigration detention that includes greater process.
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tion detention may become fair but not just,43 as critics of the U.S. criminal
system have alleged44-a system with many lawyers and much incarcera-
tion.
If the civil label of detention reform is to mean anything, I argue, it must
mean not only "better," less restrictive detention with criminal-like process,
but less detention.45 As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, "[i]n our society,
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to [criminal] trial or without [crimi-
nal] trial is the carefully limited exception." 46 This necessitates a princi-
ples-based, not rules- or specifications-based approach. More meaningful
long-term reform would be to enact a system of civil custody and supervi-
sion employing a spectrum of restrictions, more narrowly tailored to the af-
fected population, with relatively few individuals in secure detention.
Accordingly, I propose here a three-pronged framework for a civil de-
tention system, with specific recommendations-that it involve (1) less in-
cidence of detention, with (2) shorter duration, and (3) a different nature of
liberty restrictions, outside the traditional 24-7 secure facility model, and
perhaps warranting reevaluation of procedural due process tests. 47 On the
latter point, DHS could use non-secure or semi-secure facilities-
residences that allow individuals to come and go, or facilities allowing ex-
tended furloughs. Scholars such as Michael Flynn have called non-secure
facilities "not detention."48 Yet that is precisely the point. To be "truly
civil," a system of civil detention should detain less.
Lastly, I evaluate the political viability of current "civil" detention re-
forms. To be clear, DHS has not completed its goals as Schriro defined
them. Of ICE's four other planned civil facilities besides Kames, two have
stalled due to local political opposition, and two others have still received
43 Cf Gopnik, supra note 38; see also Hernandez at 1346 (noting that incorporating criminal pro-
cedural protections into immigration law would "alter the immigration detention decision making and
adjudication process... less radically than first appears," in part due to substantively strict immigration
laws regarding the consequences of criminal convictions).
44 William Stuntz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); Michelle Alexander,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). See also
McLeod, supra note 19, at 168-73.
45 Mark Noferi, New ABA Civil Immigration Detention Standards: Does "Civil" Mean Better
Detention Or Less Detention?, CRIMMIGRATION BLOG (Aug. 28, 2012, 4:00 am),
http://crimmigration.com/2012/08/28/new-aba-civil-immigration-detention-standards-does-civil-mean-
better-detention-or-less-detention.aspx.
46 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
47 See Noferi, supra note 42. See also Robert Koulish, Entering the Risk Society: A Contested Ter-
rain for Immigration Enforcement, JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CONTROL 61, 77 (Oct. 2012) (noting US
courts' differing treatment of immigration custody); Erin Murphy, Paradigms Of Restraint, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1321, 1352 (in criminal justice, as a matter of procedural due process "liberty interests tend to
begin only at the jailhouse door").
48 FLYNN, supra note 33 at 23. See also Michael Flynn, Who Must Be Detained? Proportionality
as a Tool For Critiquing Immigration Detention Policy, REFUGEE SURV. Q. 1, 8-9 (2012).
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serious human rights criticism. 49 Criticisms remain widespread of ICE fa-
cility conditions across the country.50 Detention standards have "not yet
been fully implemented." 5 1 Oversight remains self-governing, with its re-
sults unclear, 52 and potentially exacerbated by the growing use of privately
operated facilities. 5 3 Recently, as large numbers of Central American fami-
lies and children have arrived, the Administration has temporarily priori-
tized its existing civil detention bed space for them, 54 and requested $879
million in emergency funding for additional detention.55
Yet so far, both pro-immigrant advocates and restrictionists seem to re-
ject the fundamental premise of reform-agreeing that immigration deten-
tion is jail, and only disagreeing on whether immigrants belong there. 56
Civil detention reform has largely been a policymakers' movement, and the
lack of a natural political constituency for reform may endanger its long
term viability.
This Article contains five parts. Part I addresses the utility of comparing
immigration detention and SVP commitment to define the new civil deten-
tion paradigm. Part II provides an overview of the U.S. immigration deten-
tion system-the underlying rationales, detained population, conditions,
and procedures. In this section, I comprehensively examine for the first
time in scholarship ICE's recent detention standards, as well as the ABA's
new model immigration detention standards. Part III provides a compara-
49 See infra Section V.B.
50 See, e.g., USCIRF 2013, supra note 11, at 3 (detainees generally "remain in jails and jail-like
detention centers"); Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Cindy Carcamo, Overcrowded, unsanitary conditions
seen at immigrant detention centers, L.A. Times (June 18, 2014),
http://www. latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-texas-immigrant-children-20140618-
storyhtml#page= 1.
51 USCIRF2013 at 7.
52 Sthanki, supra note 21, at 497-500.
53 See infra Section IV.A,
54 Karnes is now hosting Central American women and children. Susan Carroll, Feds will house
immigrant families at detention center near San Antonio, Houston Chronicle (July 18, 2014),
http://www.chron.com/news/article/Feds-will-house-immigrant-families-at-detention-5630925.php.
55 Barack Obama, Letter to Speaker John Boehner, (July 8, 2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/budget-amendments/emergency-
supplemental-request-to-congress-07082014.pdf. This article addresses ICE adult detention facility
standards, and not separate family detention standards; see U.S. ICE, Family Residential Standards,
https://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/family-residential/, or detention of children in Health and Hu-
man Services facilities. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Chil-
dren & Families, Unaccompanied Children Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/unaccompanied-children-frequently-asked-questions. This article also addresses
standards for ICE long-term detention, rather than Border Patrol short-term detention, which has also
received serious criticism for poor conditions. See, e.g., AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, No Ac-
tion Taken: Lack of CBP Accountability in Responding to Complaints of Abuse, (May 4, 2014),
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/no-action-taken-lack-cbp-accountabiity-
responding-complaints-abuse.
56 See infra Section V.B.
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ble overview of U.S. sex offender post-conviction civil commitment. Part
IV draws descriptive conclusions as to the emerging civil detention para-
digm. Part V identifies a preliminary framework for a civil detention re-
gime, and assesses the political viability of current civil detention reforms.
I. Comparing Immigration Detention and Sexually Violent Predator
("SVP") Civil Commitment
As background, this section summarizes the practices, population
and costs, and of both immigration detention and SVP civil commitment,
and then explores the utility of comparing the two civil schemes.
A. Immigration Detention: Legal Framework, Population and Costs
Immigrant detainees are detained to prevent flight or public safety
risk (similar to criminal pretrial detainees). 57 Most immigrant detainees are
detained pursuant to one of several statutory authorities. 58 An immigrant
may be detained pending his formal deportation proceedings in immigra-
tion court (pre-hearing detention), either with an individualized bond de-
termination, 59 or without bond, if he has committed certain crimes.60 Addi-
tionally, "arriving aliens" at the border are detained pending proceedings if
deemed inadmissible.6 1 For those ordered removed, DHS is mandated by
law to initially detain such immigrants pending physical removal (post-
removal order detention). 62
57 Legomsky, supra note 20, at 537-39.
58 See Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 609-13 (2010) (reviewing detention authorities); Mark Noferi, CENTER FOR
MIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: BEHIND THE RECORD NUMBERS (Feb. 13, 2014) (ana-
lyzing detention trends), http://cmsny.org/immigration-detention-behind-the-record-numbers/.
59 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006 & Supp. 2011). DHS may also release the immigrant on parole.
60 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011). The criteria for mandatory detention, such as the de-
termination of an "aggravated felony" or "crime involving moral turpitude," are extremely complicated,
and can encompass minor conduct such as simple drug possession or subway turnstile jumping. See
Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation, supra note 42, at 89-94. Also, as 91 percent of immigra-
tion detainees were male as of 2009, 1 will default to using "he" in this Article. See Schriro Report, su-
pra note 4, at 6.
61 These may include returning lawful permanent residents and asylum seekers. 8 U.S.C.
§1225(b)(I)(B)(iii) (IV), (b)(2)(A). They may be paroled into the United States for humanitarian rea-
sons. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
62 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (such an immigrant is mandatorily detained for 90
days after the order of removal, and if not removed by then, may be released under supervision, after
receiving a custody review); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2011); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13-241.14
(2009) (certain inadmissible or criminal aliens, or immigrants whom DHS determines to pose flight risk
or danger, may be detained beyond the 90-day removal period); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (detention may
not constitutionally extend beyond a period "reasonably necessary to secure removal."). See Kalhan,
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Further, an increasing number of immigrants are detained pursuant to
summary, out-of-court processes. DHS uses "expedited removal" to sum-
marily remove, without a court hearing, noncitizens who encounter immi-
gration authorities at or within 100 miles of a US border with insufficient
or fraudulent documents. 63 Detention is mandatory pending removal, ex-
cept for those found to have a "credible fear" of persecution,64 who can
then either be paroled by DHS or have a bond hearing in immigration court
while they pursue an asylum claim. 65 DHS also uses "reinstatement of re-
moval" to summarily remove those with a prior removal order.66 Similarly,
detention is mandatory pending removal, under post-removal order authori-
ties, except for those found to have a "reasonable fear" of persecution.67 In
fiscal year 2012, DHS effectuated a record 75 percent of its removals via
these summary processes that involve mandatory detention, and the number
of individuals detained has risen accordingly. 68
Current laws and DHS practices thus result in over-detention relative to
DHS' purported aims, in several ways. 69 In in-court removal proceedings,
DHS interprets the statute mandating "custody" of those with prior crimes
to require incarcerative detention, rather than supervision or monitoring. 70
DHS also aggressively interpreted this statute to require detention of immi-
grants not taken into ICE custody immediately after release from criminal
custody.71 Moreover, DHS officers and immigration judges' discretionary
bond decisions, for those eligible for individualized determinations, over-
supra note 24, at 46 & n.29 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-701 (2001) (defining six
months as presumptively reasonable); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (extending
Zadvydas to inadmissible noncitizens)).
63 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), 1182(a)(6)(C), (7)(A)(i)(I)); 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (2004) (expand-
ing definition of "border" to within 100 miles).
64 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(l)(A)(i)), (B)(iii)(1V).
65 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3(c).
66 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8.
67 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(f); 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(2). See generally Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty:
The Use Of International Human Rights Law To Realign Immigration Detention In The United States,
36 Fordham Int'l L. J. 243, 308-12 (2013).
68 Noferi, BEHIND THE RECORD NUMBERS, supra note 15. That said, DHS has not released num-
bers of detainees by removal authority. Kalhan, supra note 24, at 46; Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ling
Lin, Immigration Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case Management Responsibili-
ties? 23-25 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1 009.pdf.
69 Kalhan, supra note 24, at 53-56.
70 See RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, FREED BUT NOT FREE: A
REPORT EXAMINING THE CURRENT USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION, 24-25 (July
2012) [hereinafter FREED BUT NOT FREE], available at
http://www.law.newark.rutgers.edu/files/FreedbutnotFree.pdf (citing Memorandum from the American
Immigration Lawyers Association to David Martin 9 (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=94.).
71 Kalhan, supra note 24, at 54 n.83 (citing Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224
(W.D. Wash. 2004)).
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whelmingly result in either denial or prohibitively high bond settings. 72
Most detainees do not have criminal convictions. 73 But given the "close
connection" of the immigration detention system to the criminal system, 74
immigrants with criminal convictions are particularly more likely to be
over-detained relative to their danger in the immigration system than the
criminal system75 (and criminal defendants are likely over-detained as it
is).76 DHS also likely underutilizes its parole authority for those in sum-
mary processes with a fear of persecution. 77
In fiscal year 2014, ICE spent nearly $2 billion to detain immigrants.78
The average cost of detaining an immigrant, accounting for personnel
costs, is $159/day (or over $58,000/year). 79 (It is unclear whether costs are
higher in a new "civil" facility like Karnes.) Comparatively, less restrictive
forms of custody ("alternatives to detention"), such as electronic monitor-
ing or supervised release, generally range in cost from 30 cents to $8/day.8O
DHS spent $92 million on alternatives to detention in fiscal year 2014, and
72 Joshua Occhiogrosso-Schwartz, Insecure Communities, Devastated Families: New Data on Im-
migrant Detention and Deportation Practices in New York City 8-11 (July 23, 2012),
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012-FINAL.pdf.
See infra Section V.A.
73 Kerwin and Li, supra note 68, at 1 (58 percent of detainees on January 25, 2009 did not have a
criminal record).
74 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 365, 366 (2011) (stating there is "close connection" of deporta-
tion to criminal process); cf. McLeod, supra note 19, at 154 ("when immigration regulation happens
through or in reference to criminal law administration--when suspected immigration law violators are
conflated with criminal law violators, a set of deeply rooted assumptions and practices are set in mo-
tion").
75 See Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation, supra note 42, at 83 & n. 105; In re Juan of
Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (setting out factors for immigration judge to consider when
determining bond, including criminal charges or convictions).
76 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REv. 497, 554
(2012) (analyzing criminal pretrial detention data and concluding that the U.S. currently over-detains
older defendants, defendants with clean records prior to their instant charge, and defendants charged
with fraud and public-order offenses). All of these types of defendants might well be mandatorily de-
tained without bail in the immigration system, even long after their criminal charges. See also Mark
Noferi, Mandatory Immigration Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption of Dangerous-
ness, IMMIGRATION DETENTION, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=mnoferi; Noferi, Cascading Con-
stitutional Deprivation, supra note 42, at 83 & n. 105.
77 Kalhan, supra note 24, at 54 n.86.
78 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT SALARIES
AND EXPENSES, 62 (2014).
79 NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, 2 (2013), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/mathofimmigrationdetention.pdf; Leslie E. V6lez &
Megan Bremer, Unlocking Liberty: A Way Forward for U.S. Immigration Detention Policy 11 (2011),
available at http://www.lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCK1NGLIBERTY.pdf;
80 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT SALARIES
AND EXPENSES, 62 (2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-
Congressional-Budget-Justification-FY2015.pdf; see also Samuel Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the
Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L. J. 1344, 1372-74 (2014) (similar costs of criminal justice monitor-
ing).
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their scale remains limited.81 In 2013, 22,090 were participating in these
alternative programs (compared to the over 477,000 who passed through
detention). 82 An independent study found the programs essentially func-
tion as "alternatives to release," not "alternatives to detention," as most in
supervision were nonviolent immigrants who would have otherwise been
released. 83
B. SVP Civil Commitment: Legal Framework, Population and Costs
SVP committees are detained to prevent public safety risk (although un-
der a corollary presumption of treatment to potentially improve their dan-
gerous mental abnormality, else detention would be permanent). 84 SVP
commitment, for most involved, has an even closer connection to the crim-
inal process than immigration detention. 85 Typically, SVP commitment is
triggered by prior criminal activity, as it requires prior instances of sexual
misconduct as evidence of future dangerousness. 86 Indeed, the SVP-
committed population is composed almost entirely of past criminals, as
compared to immigration detention, in which a majority of detainees have
no criminal record.
Like immigration detention, SVP commitment likely results in over-
detention relative to the actual dangerousness of the detainees. There is no
evidence that sex offenders recidivate at greater numbers than other catego-
ries of criminals; if anything, the opposite is true. 87
81 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT SALARIES
AND EXPENSES, 60 (2014). See also FREED BUT NOT FREE, at 5; SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 20-
21.
82 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT SALARIES
AND EXPENSES, 82 (2014).
83 See also FREED BUT NOT FREE, at 9 (describing Intensive Supervision Appearance Program
("ISAP")).
84 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-361, 364 (1997) (ruling that aim of sex offender civil
commitment is to prevent the commission of future crimes, but noting that commitment is "on-
ly potentially indefinite," subject to periodic review) (emphasis Court's).
85 Ryan K. Melcher, Note, There Ain't No End for the "Wicked": Implications of and Recommen-
dations for § 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act After United States v. Comstock, 97 IOWA L. REv. 629, 652
(2012).
86 See Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 164 (citing, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-3803 (2010) (requiring
"repeated misconduct in sexual matters")). Prior criminal conduct is used "solely for evidentiary pur-
poses" to establish requisite future dangerousness. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362 (citing Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986)). Federal law does not require an actual charge or conviction, while fifteen
states do. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (may be civilly committed if serving a federal sentence - not
necessarily for sexual misconduct - and, among other factors, has "engaged or attempted to engage in
sexually violent conduct or child molestation") with Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 557 n. 25 (collecting
state statutes requiring antecedent charge or conviction for sexual misconduct).
87 Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L.
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As of 2010, approximately 5,264 sexually violent predators ("SVPs")
were detained after their criminal sentences, by twenty states, the District
of Columbia, and the federal government. 88 Costs of SVP civil commit-
ment have been high. As of 2010, twenty states spent approximately $500
million on civil commitment of sex offenders- an average cost of approxi-
mately $100,000 per year per offender, about four times the cost of pris-
on. 89 Higher costs appear primarily due to treatment, programs, supervised
freedoms, 90 and especially, the need for psychiatric experts at trial. 9 1
C. The Utility of Comparing Immigration Detention and SVP Civil
Commitment
The immigration detention and SVP commitment frameworks share key
commonalities that make these two regimes an apt starting point to describe
the civil paradigm. Both systems share preventive purposes, with the pri-
mary goal incapacitation of the detainee to prevent future crimes, since de-
tainees are perceived to pose danger.92
Perhaps most significantly for purposes of this Article, both systems
share both the legal and expressive commonality of the "civil" designation,
& CRIMINOLOGY 969, 973-74 (2011) (summarizing empirical evidence).
88 Katherine Godin, Comments in Opposition to H 5874 - Relating to Civil Commitment of Sex-
ually Violent Predators, R.I. ACLU 1 (2011),
http://riaclu.org/images/uploads/2011_CivilCommitmentWrittenTestimony.pdf (stating 5,200 sex
offenders were detained by twenty states as of 2010); Nina Totenberg, Federal Prisoners Kept Beyond
Their Sentence, NPR, January 12, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=122452485 (discussing how 84 federal sex of-
fenders were detained by the federal government as of 2010). In 2012, USA TODAY reported that the
federal government detained 64 SVPs. See Brad Heath, Sexual Predators Rarely Committed Under
Justice Program, USA TODAY, March 19, 2012, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-1 3/dangerous-sexual-predators-
detained/53621210/1.
89 Rhode Island ACLU, Comments in Opposition to H 5874 - Relating to Civil Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators (2011), available at
http://riaclu.org/images/uploads/2011CivilCommitmentWritten Testimony.pdf. Kansas spends as
much as $185,000 per year per offender. Id at 1.
90 Gary Craig, Civil Commitment of sex offenders costs state $175,000 apiece, Rochester Demo-
crat and Chronicle (Dec. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20101226/NEWS01/1226031 1/Civil-confinement-sex-
offenders-costs-state- 175-000-apiece.
91 New York spent nearly $3 million on experts to evaluate sex offenders and testify at civil com-
mitment trials. Id. Massachusetts spent over $1.3 million between 2006 and 2008. Rhode Island
ACLU, supra note 89, at 2.
92 David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J.
1003, 1007 (2002); Steven H. Legomsky, The Detention ofAliens: Theories, Rules, And Discretion, 30
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 531, 537-39 (1999); Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power Or Con-
trolling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment And Sicherungverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621,
1627 (2003) ("the only guaranteed method to prevent the further commission of sexual offenses by
former sex offenders is to incapacitate them"); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-361.
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distinct from criminal detention or incarceration. 93 Indeed, this expressive
quality of the "civil" label may be the primary distinction between pre-
hearing immigration detention and pretrial criminal detention. Several
scholars have noted the similarities between the two, in legal classification
(both civil), 94 goals (both designed to prevent flight from proceedings and
preserve public safety),95 mechanisms (detention in jails, bond, and super-
vision), 96 and detention standards (both initially based on jail standards). 97
That said, legally, neither immigration detention, nor SVP commitment,
nor criminal pretrial detention can be punishment.98 U.S. case law has rec-
ognized that civil detainees should not be incarcerated with, or exactly like,
convicted criminals, even if case law has not delineated how civil detain-
ees' conditions should be different. 99 Following this, courts have mainly
examined challenges to immigration detention conditions,100 and SVP
commitment conditions,101 under the same admittedly deferential standard
as pretrial criminal detention.
93 The "civil" designation also distinguishes these systems from other forms of noncriminal pre-
ventive detention. That said, I exclude military or national security detention from this analysis because
its legal framework and expressive qualities connote a more imminent state of emergency than "civil"
detention. See Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 90-123 (summarizing military and emergency deten-
tion powers). Additionally, regarding quarantine - health-related emergency detention - although it is
legally and expressively civil, I use SVP commitment as more emblematic of the emerging civil deten-
tion paradigm because quarantine laws do "not see much use today." Id. at 170.
94 Kalhan, supra note 24, at 51 & n. 66.
95 Legomsky, The Detention ofAliens, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. at 537-39.
96 Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis, 56 AM. U. L. REV. at 391.
97 See Kalhan, supra note 24, at 50.
98 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (evaluating criminal pretrial detention under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, and holding "the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the
detainee"). Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362-63; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 548-52 (2003)
(Souter, J., dissenting);
99 Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 742 (2011)
(stating "Clearly, detainees should not be treated like convicts..."). See also generally Hernandez, su-
pra note 21, at 1389-91. This conflation has also spilled over into legal analyses of pretrial detention
and post-conviction incarceration. See Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2013) (noting "chaotic" state of case law governing conditions claims by
pretrial detainees, and frequent conflation of Fifth Amendment standards for pretrial detainees with
Eighth Amendment standards for convicted prisoners).
100 The Fifth Circuit has considered challenges to immigration detention conditions under the
same standard, and most U.S. courts have followed. Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir.
2000) ("We consider a person detained for deportation to be the equivalent of a pretrial detainee"); see
also, e.g, Adekoya v. Herron, 2013 WL 6092507, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164575, *25 (W.D.N.Y.
2013); Baptiste v. Essex Cnty, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175154, *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2013); Belbachir v.
County of McHenry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141230, *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012). That said, the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuit have considered claims by excludable noncitizens under the less stringent standard
that detention must not involve "gross physical abuse." Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir.
1987); Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552, 1559 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
101 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (if SVP committee "is confined in condi-
tions identical to [or] similar to ... those in which his criminal counterparts are held, we presume that
the detainee is being subjected to 'punishment."'); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (in-
voluntary committee to state institution for mentally retarded).
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Yet criminal pretrial detention is different because it is expressively
criminal. It occurs in jails that are built and held out to the public as part of
the criminal justice system,102 leading easily to perceived conflation be-
tween pretrial detention and post-conviction incarceration, despite their dif-
ferent legal statuses. For example, as Adam Kolber points out, courts met-
ing out punishment at sentencing routinely grant credit for time served in
pretrial detention, even though pretrial detention is legally not punish-
ment. 10 3
Thus, reforms to immigration detention and SVP commitment are not
only undertaken,l0 4 but expressively billed as "civil" in a way absent in the
criminal justice field.105 Comparing these two civil systems allows for
common assessment of this expressive value (for example, its impact on
the political acceptance of detention reforms).
Key differences do exist between immigration detention and SVP civil
commitment. Both immigration detention and SVP commitment have oth-
er goals in addition to incapacitation-with immigration, to prevent flight
from proceedings,106 and with SVP commitment, to treat the committee un-
til he is no longer dangerous.107 That said, as described below, in both sys-
tems those goals are subsumed in practice to the goal of incapacitation to
prevent public danger. 108
102 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).
103 Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2013)
("Even though pretrial detention is technically not punishment, it is harsh treatment, and most people
are inclined to give offenders credit for it.").
104 See MARGARET TAYLOR, SYMBOLIC DETENTION, IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 153, 156 (1997)
(the conditions of detention are a "component of its symbolic message").
105 See Bernstein, supra note 2. Pretrial criminal justice reforms, conversely, are billed as criminal
justice reforms, not "civil" reforms. See Pretrial Justice Institute, Implementing the Recommendations
of the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice: The 2013 Progress Report (2014) (not once mentioning




106 In the case of noncitizens arriving in the United States ("arriving aliens"), detention is also
used to prevent their entering the U.S. Legomsky, supra note 20, at 537-39.
107 Otherwise, detention would be unconstitutionally punitive rather than regulatory. Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 367-68 (1997). At a constitutional minimum, the person must be dangerous to others and
suffer from a mental illness or "mental abnormality." Id. at 360. A subsidiary requirement is that the
offender have "serious difficulty" controlling his behavior. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
See generally Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 164.
108 All SVP facilities by law must provide treatment, although the system is ofi-criticized because
of the tension between disclosing information in therapy regarding past misdeeds and the effect of dis-
closure upon release (similar to parole hearings). Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism
and Preventive Detention, 101 J. CPIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 983-84 (2011); New York State Office
of Mental Health, Annual Report on the Implementation of Mental Hygiene Law Article 11 (July 2011),
available at http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/statistics/SOMTAReport_2010.pdf; Demleitner, supra
note 92, at 1634 (discussing how SVP commitment is criticized in practice as "incapacitative rather
than therapeutic"), citing Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of
Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 82 (1999)).
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Another difference is that immigration detention is short-term (in theo-
ry), with the final endpoint being the deportation hearing or deportation it-
self,109 while SVP commitment is long-term in theory and practice, with
the only endpoint being successful treatment, if ever achieved. 110 That
said, this distinction does not bear on whether conditions of confinement
are "civil."ll' Moreover, both systems detain without a fixed endpoint,
raising the possibility of psychological harm from indefinite detention, as
researchers have documented regarding detained immigrants."l 2 Notably,
this research has found that the traumas from indefinite detention "appear
to be independent of the conditions of detention."1 3 Thus, even in im-
proved, "civil" facility conditions, indefinite detention still poses a "huge
threat" to "health and wellbeing," as Swedish researchers found., 14
109 In practice, immigrants may be and are detained for years. See, e.g., Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d
221 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding mandatory detention without individualized hearing for nearly three years
unreasonable); Kalhan supra note 24, at 49. Given current court backlogs, the average case now takes
over a year and a half to make its way through the immigration courts. Hector Becerra, Immigration
court backlog adds to border crisis, L.A. Times (July 9, 2014), available at
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-court-20140710-story.html#page=1.
Another potential distinction is that an immigration detainee arguably possesses the "keys to his own
cell" because he may escape detention by accepting deportation, while SVP detainees have no such op-
tion. That said, U.S. courts have generally rejected this argument because it infringes upon the immi-
gration detainee's due process right to litigate his deportation hearing (so long as the detainee possesses
a valid claim and deportation is not final). See Hall v. I.N.S., 253 F. Supp. 2d 244, 254 n. 17 (D. R.I.
2003); Chanthanounsy v. Cumberland County Sheriff, 2002 WL 1477170 (D. Me. July 9, 2002), affd,
2002 WL 31112190 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 2002).
110 SVP commitment is typically subject to periodic review, see 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e) (2006). Ad-
ditionally, SVP detainees are presumed to one-day return into the U.S., unlike detained immigrants.
111 See FLYNN, supra note 33, at 8 ("there is no minimum amount of time during which custody
should not be considered deprivation of liberty").
112 The indefinite nature of immigration detention causes psychological and physical trauma (and
exacerbates past traumas for immigrant asylum seekers). Indefinite detainees have little information or
control over their confinement, and experience circumstances similar to "sensory deprivation."
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUNISHMENT BEFORE JUSTICE: INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE U.S 7-
11 (2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHRReports/indefinite-detention-june201 l.Pdf, thus, as Swe-
dish immigrant detainees reported, "detention is worse than prison because in prison at least the out-
come and the time period are known." Soorej Jose Puthoopparambil, Beth Maina-Ahlberg & Magdale-
na Bjerneld, Do Higher Standards of Detention Promote Well-Being? 44 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 39
(2013), available at http://www.fmreview.org/detention/puthoopparambil-et-al#sthash.qtDveW84.dpufi
Immigration detainees thus develop feelings of "helplessness and hopelessness that lead to debilitating
depressive symptoms, chronic anxiety, despair, dread," and "PTSD and suicidal ideation." PHYSICIANS
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS at 11; CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE (CVT), TORTURE ABOLITION AND
SURVIVOR SUPPORT COALITION, INTERNATIONAL (TASSC), AND UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST SERVICE
COMMITTEE (UUSC), TORTURED & DETAINED: SURVIVOR STORIES OF U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION
11 (Nov. 2013), http://www.uusc.org/files/ReportTorturedAndDetained.Nov2013.pdf; Janet Cleve-
land, Psychological Harm and the Case for Alternatives, 44 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 7-8 (2013)
(providing Canadian research), available at
http://www.fmreview.org/detention/cleveland%20#sthash.kZt8o3pC.dpuf, see also Brief of 26 Profes-
sors and Researchers of Sociology, Criminology, Anthropology and Law as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellees and Urging Affirmance, Robbins v. Rodriguez, No. 12-56734, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th
Cir. 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rodriguez socialscience amicus.pdf.
113 PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS at 7 (emphasis added).
114 Puthoopparambil et al. at 39. The U.S. Supreme Court took a different view than psychological
research regarding the indefinite nature of immigration detention. It essentially held that in pre-removal
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Additionally, SVP commitment is designed to detain citizens, while im-
migration detention is designed to detain noncitizens. Thus, SVP commit-
ment has historically operated on the legal assumption that additional pro-
cess is required (such as appointed counsel), while immigration detention
has historically operated on the opposite assumption that little process is
required, if any."l 5 That said, U.S. courts and legislatures are moving to-
wards imposing additional procedural safeguards immigration detention, as
described below. 116
Moreover, notwithstanding the difference in citizenship, I argue the two
detained populations are more similar than dissimilar in that both are his-
torically politically powerless, and commonly stereotyped as especially
dangerous and "criminal" despite contrary empirical evidence.1 ' 7 SVP and
immigration laws thus both represent detention "exceptionalism."l 18
hearing detention, the existence of an endpoint, even if not fixed, constituted a "definite termination
point," as opposed to post-removal order detention; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 529 (2003), citing
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001) ("post-removal-period detention, unlike detention pend-
ing a determination of removability, has no obvious termination point." ).
115 Mark Nofei, Framing the Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings: Law and Society
2014 Recap, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 11, 2014) ("acknowledging the historical perception of
immigration law as a largely rights-free realm"), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2014/06/-framing-the-right-to-counsel-in-immigration-
proceedings-law-and-society-2014-recap-by-mark-noferi.html; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 521
("Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens") (citing Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). This is so even though the Due Process Clause has been interpreted
to apply to noncitizens for over a century. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); see generally Hiro-
shi Motomura, The Curious Evolution Of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates For Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).
116 Resnik, supra note 32. See also Section lI.B.
117 Yung, supra note 28, at 988 ("It is difficult, if not impossible, to name a group in the United
States that is more reviled than sex offenders...."); Joseph Margulies, Preventive Detention, Deviance,
Risk, And Law, 101 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 753-54 (2011) (discussing the public's view of
sex offenders as "super-predators"); Jennifer Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions,
Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (describing conflation of immigrants with
criminal threats); MARIA JOAO GUIA, Crimmigration, Securitisation and the Criminal Law of the
Crimmigrant, JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CONTROL 18, 27-29 (2012); Mark Noferi, Mandatory Immigration
Detention for US. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption of Dangerousness, IMMIGRATION DETENTION,
RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context-mnoferi.
118 See Yung, supra note 28, at 997-998; C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hemndez, Invisible Spaces
and Invisible Lives In Immigration Detention, 57 How. L.J. 869, 873-880 (2014).
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. U.S. Immigration Detention: A Survey
In this section, I briefly survey the conditions and attendant process-
es of the immigration detention and SVP civil commitment systems.
A. The Civil Immigration Detention Model
Here, I describe the new civil immigration detention model. I organize
this analysis by the areas of reform Dr. Schriro targeted to tailor immigra-
tion detention to its non-criminal aims: (1) overarching strategy and stand-
ards, (2) conditions of confinement, (3) programs and recreational opportu-
nities, and (4) oversight, accountability, and transparency."19
I focus on ICE's recent 2011 standards governing its civil model. In
nearly all respects, ICE's new standards are still modeled after and explicit-
ly cite the American Correctional Association's (ACA) model Core Jail
Standards, designed for jails that house both pre-trial and post-conviction
criminal defendants.120 I also analyze parallel model standards for immi-
gration detention recently promulgated by the American Bar Associa-
tion. 121
Overarching Strategy and Standards
Dr. Schriro made recommendations as to the broad strategies, policies,
and practices by which detainees are managed, and recommended specifi-
cally that ICE develop separate standards for immigration detainees. 122 In
early 2012, ICE released new Performance-Based Detention National
Standards ("PBNDS") for detention facilities under its control.123 The new
PBNDS, following Schriro's recommendations, provide for housing immi-
grant detainees separately from criminal detainees, and provides a system
to more meaningfully classify immigration detainees by security risk. 124
119 See SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
120 The Core Jail Standards are a subset of the American Correctional Association Performance-
based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, designed to house "persons awaiting trial, serving
sentences, or otherwise are locally confined." American Jail Association, Resolutions of the American
Jail Association 9 (compiled April 2012),
http://www.aja.org/assets/cms/files/Membership/Resolutions%2004_2012.pdffhe ICE Performance-
Based Detention National Standards cite the ACA Core Jail Standards in nearly every relevant section.
121 See ABA Standards, supra note 25.
122 SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, 16; Improving Conditions, supra note 4, at 1146-47
(ICE's 2000 and revised 2008 standards both based upon American Correctional Association standards
for pre-trial defendants). Dr. Schriro also identified special concerns regarding special populations -
families with minor children, women, the ill and infirm, asylum seekers, and vulnerable populations. Id.
123 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 66-78.
124 Id.
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Both of these standards, if implemented, would constitute an im-
provement for detainees. Generally, immigration detention has been criti-
cized for its similarity to criminal incarceration, 125 and in many cases even
worse conditions.126 Detainees have commonly been housed in actual pris-
ons and jails with individuals serving criminal sentences and have been
forced to wear prison uniforms. 127 In 2009, 50 percent of detainees were
housed in county jails contracted to ICE.128 Conditions of confinement at
new facilities like Karnes thus represent an improvement.
Still, the default for the new ICE model is round-the-clock confine-
ment-similar to confinement of criminal defendants, if not with them.129
Indeed, the PBNDS formal detainee classification system of low-, medium-
, or high- custody is essentially analogous to low, medium, or high security
prisons in the criminal system.130
The ABA standards, by comparison, advocate more broadly for ICE to
use a "continuum of strategies and programs" to achieve its main goal of
preventing flight from deportation. These strategies range from "release on
recognizance or parole, to release on bond, to community-based supervised
release programs, to 'alternative to detention' programs with various levels
of supervision, to home detention (with strict conditions) that represent an
alternative "form" of detention, to detention in civil detention facilities." 131
In doing so, the ABA model standards (if implicitly) go beyond recom-
mendations to reform detention conditions per se, to offer recommenda-
tions to reform a system that over-detains.132
Conditions of Confinement
Dr. Schriro also made recommendations for less restrictive conditions of
detention: adopting the "fewest number of custody classifications neces-
125 See SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
126 See, e.g., Detention Watch Network, Detention Watch Network Expose And Close Reports On
10 Of The Worst Immigrant Prisons In The US,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ExposeAndClose; Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Chal-
lenging Conditions Of Confinement And The Porous Border Of The Plenary Power Doctrine, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1113 (1995) ("[t]he overall picture... is one of harsh detention conditions
similar to -- and sometimes worse than -- the prevailing conditions for criminal incarceration.").
127 Detention Watch Network, Expose And Close, at 2; IACHR, supra note 13, at 246-47 ("in
every circumstance described here, the immigration detainees are treated as criminals").
128 SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
129 See PBNDS at 85 ("The facility's front entrance shall be a controlled access point. Entrance
into the secure perimeter shall be controlled with electronic interlocking doors or grilles to prevent un-
authorized entry or exit."), citing American Correctional Association, Performance-based Standards for
Adult Local Detention Facilities, 4th Edition, 4-ALDF-2A-07.
130 FLYNN, supra note 33, at 21-22; Flynn, Who Must, supra note 48, at 10.
131 ABA Standards, supra note 25, at § II.C n. 1., p. 4 .
132 Noferi, supra note 45, New ABA Civil Immigration Detention Standards.
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sary," providing greater access throughout the facility, and "normalizing
the living environment for low-custody aliens." 133 The new 2011 PBNDS
followed these recommendations, although its standards do not materially
differ from jail standards. The PBDNS provide that detainees shall be as-
signed to the "least restrictive housing unit consistent with facility safety
and security."1 34 That said, the PBNDS still provide for "continuous super-
vision by staff."35 Most significantly, the ICE PBNDS, like jail standards,
envision a facility with a "secure perimeter."1 36
Conversely, the ABA standards perhaps subtly point the way to qualita-
tively different facilities that do not require round-the-clock confinement.
Under "Physical Plant and Environment," the ABA standard provides that a
facility should be "secured by controlled access and perimeter walls if nec-
essary."1 37 It is unclear whether the ABA is recommending a facility that
should be secured "if necessary"-i.e., an "open" check-in or registration
facility, to which immigrants can come and go. 138 Or, the ABA might be
recommending a facility like Karnes that should be secured by controlled
access, but with the most prison-like controls present "if necessary"-i.e.,
perimeter walls, prison-like towers, fences, or barbed wire. 139 While the
latter might be an improvement, the former would be a dramatic change
from US practices to date.
ICE's furlough policy is extremely limited, to "emergency requests" and
only with high-level signoff.140 Impacts on detainees have been document-
133 SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, 21-23 (discussing how freedom of movement was "large-
ly restricted," and many detainees were largely confined to cells).
134 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 71, citing American Correctional Association, Performance-based
Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, 4th Edition, 4-ALDF 2A-30, 2A-31, 2A-32, 2A-33, 2A-
34 [hereinafter ACA 4-ALDF].
135 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 345. Jail standards provide for "all inmate movement ... controlled
by staff." American Correctional Association, Core Jail Standard, l-CORE-2A-07 [hereinafter ACA
Core Jail Standard]. The ABA standard provides some increased freedom of movement, in that "resi-
dents should be able to move freely and without escort during daylight hours." ABA Standards, supra
note 25; see also JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 10, at 35.
136 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 5; ACA 4-ALDF, at 2A-04.
137 ABA Standards, supra note 25, at 12, § IV.B.8.
138 By comparison, some European immigration registration facilities use such an open system.
Ireland uses a "semi-secure" system in which detainees may apply for furloughs of a week or more.
FLYNN, supra note 33, at 23.
139 See ABA Standards, supra note 25 at 12 (providing for facilities secured by controlled access
and perimeter walls only "if necessary," but "not by traditional prison-like towers, fences, or barbed or
concertina wire"). The answer is unclear from the ABA standards' language and context. The ABA
cites as analogous some examples more resembling the former (i.e., domestic violence shelters, see
ABA Standards § II.C.D), some more resembling the latter (i.e., secure nursing homes or in-patient
psychiatric facilities, see id.).
140 The new ICE standards do provide for "emergency requests" to attend, inter alia, a "a family-
related state court proceeding." PBNDS, supra note 6, at 335 (Sec 5.2.V.A,). The section appears more
targeted, though, at visiting "critically ill members of the immediate family or to attend their funerals."
Id. (Sec. 5.2.11.1). This is all on a "case-by-case basis, and with approval of the respective Field Office
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ed. For example, thousands of detained immigrants lose their children in
parallel family court proceedings because ICE does not let them attend
scheduled family court conferences. 14 1 The furlough policy is limited even
for the unique needs of civil immigration detainees-i.e. the need to litigate
a deportation case in immigration court. ICE currently makes no allowance
to release or furlough detainees to help them secure counsel and challenge
their deportation, even though studies show that detention is the largest ob-
stacle to securing representation, which in turn frustrates the ability to liti-
gate proceedings effectively.142 Even criminal laws allow for exceptions for
temporary pretrial release to the extent "necessary for preparation of the
person's defense."'' 43 ICE also does not typically make allowances for its
detainees to gain post-conviction relief in criminal court and thus avoid de-
portation-for example, to bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
due to lack of immigration advice, following the Supreme Court's 2010
Padilla v. Kentucky decision. 44
ABA guidelines more broadly provide for supervised furloughs for those
with families or family court proceedings. ABA guidelines also provide
for supervised furloughs for those detained longer than 90 days, and specif-
ically home visits for those with citizen families, which represents another
step beyond the presumption of round-the-clock incarceration. 145 ABA
guidelines also more explicitly provide for furloughs for "compelling hu-
manitarian reasons" including, but not limited to, "family court proceed-
ings."146
The ICE PBNDS also provide for basic human rights, following Dr.
Director" (although he may "delegate this authority to the Assistant Field Office Director-level for any
detainee who does not require a high degree of control and supervision.") Id. at 336. Notably, "[n]o
less than two escorts are required for each trip." Id.
141 Sarah Rogerson, Lack of Detained Parents'Access to the Family Justice System and the Unjust
Severance of the Parent-Child Relationship, 47 FAMILY L.Q. 141, 154-55 (2013); Seth Freed Wessler,
Thousands of Kids Lost From Parents In US. Deportation System, COLORLINES, Nov. 2, 2011,
http://colorlines.com/archives/201 1/ 11/thousandsof kids-lost in foster homes afterparentsdeporta
tion.htmi.
142 New York Immigrant Representation Study, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy
of Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363-65, 367-68 (2011); Noferi, su-
pro note 42, at 66 ("The impact of detention and consequent lack of representation is stark.").
143 18 U.S.C. §3142(i) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
144 559 U.S. 365 (2011); NYU SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC AND FAMILIES FOR
FREEDOM, JUSTICE DETAINED, JUSTICE DENIED: IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
PREVENTS IMMIGRANTS FROM FIGHTING UNLAWFUL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 19-23 (July 2014),
available at http://familiesforfreedom.org/news/releases/%E2%80%9Cjustice-detained-justice-
denied%E2%80%9D-report-families-freedom-and-nyu-school-law-immigrant.
145 ABA Standards, supra note 25, at 39, § X.B.3. "Residents who are detained for more than 90
days, particularly those with US citizen family members and minor children, should be eligible to leave
a facility for home visits. DHS/ICE may impose reasonable conditions, including electronic monitoring
and/or an escort, to ensure a resident's continued custody and return." Id.
146 Id at 39, § X.B.4.
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Schriro's recommendations: a credible detainee grievance system, 147 medi-
cal screening,148 and infectious disease containment practices.149 The ABA
standards go further and provide for medical, dental, and mental health
screenings within 12 hours, a crucial component since 121 ICE detainees
have died since October 2003.150 The ABA standards also provide for spe-
cial training and accommodations for vulnerable populations, such as
women, children, the mentally ill, and asylum seekers (and indeed, coun-
sels that minors and pregnant women should not be detained at all).' 51 For
families, ABA guidelines provide that ICE should house detainees "within
a reasonable distance of their family, social, and cultural support systems,"
and allow visitation every day, with physical contact, for "at least two
hours ordinarily." 152
All these human rights improvements are advances over past detention
practices; all would positively impact detainees' lives, and none should be
discounted. These improvements, however, simply raise the level of civil
detention to that of criminal incarceration that meets basic human rights.
Programs and Recreational Opportunities
Dr. Schriro also made recommendations as to programs for detainees
such as a law library, contact with family and counsel, indoor and outdoor
recreation, and religious activities. 153 The 2011 ICE PBNDS address these
concerns, in some cases providing specificity beyond that of criminal jail
147 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 392; SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. Reports of physical, ver-
bal, and sexual abuse by corrections officers have been increasingly common, and complaints by de-
tainees have been met with outright hostility and threats of disciplinary action or transfer to other facili-
ties. See, e.g., JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 42; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED
AND AT RISK: SEXUAL ABUSE AND HARASSMENT IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION 18
(Aug. 2010) ("detainees at times have to seek out grievance forms from guards overseeing their care,
who may be the ones responsible for abuse or may be perceived as posing a threat of retaliation"),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/s081Owebwcover.pdf; NEW ORLEANS
WORKERS' FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, DETENTION CONDITIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION: IMMIGRANT DETAINEES REPORT FROM BASILE, LOUISIANA (July 2009) [hereinafter
DETENTION CONDITIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS], available at http://www.nowcj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/detention-conditions-report.pdf.
148 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 233-59; SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 25-26. 131 ICE detainees
have died since October 2003. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, List of Deaths in ICE Cus-
tody October 2003-June 18, 2012 (Aug. 12, 2012, 6:17 AM),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/detaineedeaths2003-present.pdf.
149 SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 22 (recommending a "well maintained physical space and
comprehensive infectious disease containment practices"); PBNDS, supra note 6; at 237-40; IACHR,
supra note 13, at 297-307 (describing insufficient food and water supplies, insufficient heat, and 50
detainees housed in the size of less than a basketball court).
150 ABA Standards, supra note 25, at § IlI.C; compare PBNDS, supra note 6, at 55.
151 ABA Standards at § IIG, XII.
152 Id. at § X.A.
153 SCHR1RO REPORT, supra note 4, at 23-25. She termed this "programs management".
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standards. For example, PBNDS provide for a law library with additional
specificity, such as that it be "large enough to provide reasonable access to
all detainees who request its use," with sufficient tables, chairs, and com-
puters, and LexisNexis and paper publications."154 PBNDS also provide for
enhanced detainee visitation by legal counsel, including confidential visits,
seven days a week, without auditory supervision, in private consultation
rooms, where detainees may retain legal materials (albeit after inspection),
and with "appropriate special assistance" to the limited-English profi-
cient. 155 The ICE PBNDS provide detainees access to outdoor recreation
four hours a day, seven days a week (weather and scheduling permitted),1 56
which goes beyond the one hour per day provided by criminal jail stand-
ards.157 The standards also provide for specific practices to ensure detain-
ees have regular opportunities to participate in religious practice, whatever
their faith.158
The proposed ABA standards go further again than ICE standards in
some respects. For example, they provide additional, specific requirements
for a law library, 159 specifically prohibit Plexiglas between lawyers and cli-
ents, 160 recommend that detainees be housed near family to facilitate visita-
154 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 342-45; compare ACA Core Jail Standard, supra note 135, at I-
CORE-5C-04 ("library services are available to inmates."). Law libraries have been described as entire-
ly absent in some detention facilities; where they exist, the materials are commonly outdated, not relat-
ing to immigration law, and only in English. KAREN TUMLIN, ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM:
CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS 33 (2009) [here-
inafter BROKEN SYSTEM], available at www.nilc.org/document.html?id=9; JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE,
supra note 10, at 32. In any event, access to law libraries is commonly limited as well. Id. at 32 (re-
quests for access often depended on the "mood of the guards.").
155 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 317-18, 341; compare ACA Core Jail Standard, supra note 135, at 1-
CORE-6A-02 ("Inmate access to counsel is ensured. Such contact includes, but is not limited to, tele-
phone communications, uncensored correspondence, and visits."). Explicit barriers to communications
with lawyers have been common in immigrant detention. A 2010 survey found 78% of detainees in fa-
cilities that prohibited lawyers from scheduling private telephone calls with clients. NATIONAL
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, ISOLATED IN DETENTION: LIMITED ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES JEOPARDIZES A FAIR DAY IN COURT 4 (Sept. 2010) (surveying
25,489 detainees in 67 detention facilities), available at
http://www. immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.orgiles/Detention%20lsolation%2OReport%2
OFULL%2OREPORT%/o202OO%2009%2023_O.pdf. Several facilities commonly prohibit contact visits
between detainees and lawyers, where legal documents may be exchanged. BROKEN SYSTEM, supra
note 154, at 14-15; IACHR, supra note 13, at 326.
156 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 290.
157 ACA Core Jail Standard, supra note 135, at I-CORE-5C-01. Exercise opportunities in immi-
grant detention been described as extremely limited or absent. JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note
10, at 41; BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 154, at 20-25.
158 PBNDS, supra note 6, at 294-303; compare SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 24 (criticizing
lack of religious access).
159 ABA Standards, supra note 25, at 15 ("access to updated legal materials including current rel-
evant codes, regulations, court rules, self-help materials, and legal forms"). They also require that all
facilities permit "know-your-rights" presentations. Id. at § VI.D.
160 Id. at 14. For counsel, ABA guidelines provide for access to detainees 12 hours a day, without
advance notice, in private, confidential rooms without Plexiglas where detainees and counsel can trade
documents. ABA Standards § VII.B-C.
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tion,161 and recommend that communal areas be available for "most of each
day."']62 Still, as with conditions of confinement, improved access to pro-
grams and recreational opportunities inside the secure perimeter are only
allowed to the extent they do not interfere with the presumption of round-
the-clock incarceration.
Oversight, Accountability and Transparency
Lastly, the new ICE PBNDS standards, and accompanying practices, re-
flect some progress towards Dr. Schriro's recommendations as to oversight,
accountability, and transparency, as well as some resistance.
Historically, insufficient federal oversight has been a primary contributor
to substandard conditions,163 exacerbated by ICE's tendency to contract
with state, local, and especially private detention facilities outside its direct
control.164 Public oversight has been difficult as well, since ICE has been
resistant to FOIA requests,165 and private facilities are typically exempt. 166
Since 2009, oversight has improved. ICE, as Dr. Schriro recommended,
has hired 42 on-site detention monitors, to answer criticisms of lax and in-
consistent enforcement of its own standards. 167
Still, the revised 2011 ICE standards remain non-binding as a matter of
law.168 Moreover, the standards do not give rise to any legal redress for de-
tainees, 169 unlike Board of Prisons standards, incorporated into federal reg-
161 Id. at 37. For families, ABA guidelines provide that ICE should house detainees "within a rea-
sonable distance of their family, social and cultural support systems," and allow visitation every day,
with physical contact, for "at least two hours ordinarily." Id. at 37-38.
162 Id. at 14, 17 ("Residents should be permitted the maximum amount of freedom of movement
within the facility, both indoors and outdoors, consistent with the safety and security of residents and
staff.").
163 Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives In Immigration De-
tention, 57 HOW. L.J. 869, 889 (2014).
164 Matthew Martin, Improving The Carceral Conditions Of Federal Immigrant Detainees, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1476. 1481 (2012); Sthanki, supra note 21, at 456-60.
165 Hernandez, Invisible Spaces, 57 How. L.J. at 890-92.
166 Lily Ostrer, Immigrant Detention, HARVARD POLITICAL REVIEW, July 8, 2012, available at
http://hpronline.org/united-states/immigrant-detention/ (quoting Mark Dow: "the culture of... the im-
migration agency, just makes the system of detention even more opaque").
167 JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 10, at V.
168 See Martin, supra note 70, at 1481 & n.37. Recent legislation that passed the Senate would
have required ICE to incorporate the standards into all contracts, required annual inspections, imposed
financial penalties for noncompliance, and made all detention facility contracts, memoranda, and re-
views subject to FOIA. The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act of 2013, 113th Cong. S. 744, § 3716 (2013) [hereinafter S. 744].
169 See Martin, at 1481 n.37 (citing Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93-94 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987)). Most likely, they are state-
ments of policy without binding effect. Id; but see Steven Neeley, Immigration Detention: The Inac-
tion of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 729 (2008) (argument
that that ICE's failure to follow its own standards, even if not formally promulgated, gives rise to a
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ulation.170 As Dr. Schriro argued, "The ultimate form of enforcement [of
standards] is regulation that also affords opportunity for relief."17 1 The re-
sulting lack of redress for detainee maltreatment, as well as detainees' ina-
bility to sue nonfederal facilities under the Federal Tort Claims Act, has
contributed to substandard conditions.172 If ICE incorporated its standards
into regulation, which might allow immigrant detainees to sue, conditions
might at least reach the minimum standards of care that many (if not all)
criminal facilities possess. 173
That said, accountability has also lagged. In an important step, ICE's re-
vised standards apply to at least some contracted facilities, if ICE's contract
specifies as such, which between state, local, and federal facilities, housed
eighty-four percent of detainees in 2011.174 But, privately owned facilities
have historically been even more removed from ICE's oversight and con-
trol,175 and have experienced some of the worst abuses.176 Riots occurred
in Reeves County, TX in 2010 and 2011,177 hunger strikes occurred in Ba-
sile County, LA in 2009,178 food is substandard, and detainees are routinely
discouraged from making complaints or grievances.i 7 9 ICE has also re-
duced its reliance on private facilities slightly-43 percent in January 2012,
down slightly from 48 percent in 2009, but still significantly up from 25
percent in 2002.180
claim under the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act).
170 Improving Conditions, supra note 4, at 1446.
171 Id. at 1451.
172 Id. at 1451, 1487-91; Sthanki, supra note 21, at 472-73.
173 Kalhan, supra note 24, at 51-52 (arguing that binding standards might "help clarify what 'truly
civil' detention requires"). Immigrant detainees are generally precluded from challenging conditions
under the Eighth Amendment, as immigration detention is not "punishment," although Fifth Amend-
ment protections apply. See generally Taylor, supra note 126, at 1090.
174 See, e.g., PBNDS, supra note 6, at 22 ("This detention standard applies to the following types
of facilities housing ERO detainees: Service Processing Centers (SPCs); Contract Detention Facilities
(CDFs); and State or local government facilities used by ERO through Intergovemmental Service
Agreements (IGSAs) to hold detainees for more than 72 hours."); Sthanki, supra note 21, at 466; Mar-
tin, supra note 70, at 1478. ICE has terminated contracts for noncompliance with its standards at only
three facilities, though, and as of 2010, continued to use facilities that had been non-compliant for two
or more years. Improving Conditions, supra note 4, at 1447.
175 Martin, supra note 70, at 1478.
176 Hemandez, Invisible Spaces, 57 HOW. L.J. 869, 886-88.
177 Nina Bernstein, Companies Use Immigration Crackdown to Turn a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2011, at Al.
178 DETENTION CONDITIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 6-7.
179 Id.
180 Mason, supra note 10, at 5. The average number of ICE detainees housed daily in private faci I-
ities grew 188% from 2002 to 2012 (from 4,841 to 13,927), compared to a 26% growth in publicly op-
erated facilities. Id.
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B.Procedures Attending Immigration Detention
Historically, few procedural protections have been afforded to immigra-
tion detainees-although this is changing, through litigation and legisla-
tion.
Detention precedes any process provided to the detainee. For example,
in formal in-court removal proceedings, the detainee must affirmatively re-
quest a bond hearing after DHS makes the initial decision (unlike criminal
proceedings, in which judges typically set bail at the outset).181 The pre-
sumptions on review favor detention, with the burden on the detainee to re-
but his detention, if an individual opportunity is provided to do so. 182 As
noted, detention is categorically mandated for those in formal removal pro-
ceedings with certain prior crimes, those in summary processes (expedited
removal or reinstatement of removal), and those post-removal order. 183
This state of affairs is changing, however. In the courts, the Ninth Cir-
cuit recently provided bond hearings to those mandatorily detained in for-
mal removal proceedings for six months or longer, 184 as did the Third Cir-
cuit on a case-by-case basis.185 Separate litigation is pending to challenge
the burden that mandatory detainees with criminal convictions must over-
come to receive an individualized hearing.' 86 Additionally, immigration
reform legislation that passed the Senate in 2013 would have required bond
hearings in formal removal proceedings within 6 days (except for those
181 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2012); compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (in federal criminal proceedings, the
magistrate determines bail at the defendant's first appearance).
182 Those discretionarily detained pre-hearing, for whom DHS has set bond or denied it, bear the
burden to show at a bond hearing before an immigration judge that they are neither a flight risk nor
danger. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2012) (respondent must demonstrate that his "release would not pose a
danger to property or persons"). Those mandatorily detained pre.hearing in formal removal proceed-
ings bear the even higher burden to first show that the Government is "substantially unlikely" to ulti-
mately establish the mandatory detention charge(s) at the removal hearing-i.e., that the Government
has no colorable argument for mandatory detention. Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A.
1999). Those detained post-removal order are mandatorily detained for 90 days, and receive adminis-
trative custody review, at which they must show "good reason to believe there is no significant likeli-
hood of removal to the country to which he or she was ordered removed," as well as lack of flight risk
and danger. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2012); see also id § 241.4(d)(1). Those detained in expedited removal
are mandatorily detained and receive no detention review. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
Only those whom are found to have a credible fear of persecution may be paroled at DHS' discretion, if
they arrived at a port of entry. US IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) NO. 11002.1,
PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE
(2010), available at http://www.ice.govdoclib/dro/pdf/1 1002.1 -hd-
parole of arrivingaliens foundcredible fear.pdf.
Outside these procedures, detainees may challenge their detention through a habeas petition in federal
court, although many do not because of the time and effort involved. Heeren, supra note 55, at 622-26.
183 Supra Section I.A.
184 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
185 Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011).
186 Gayle v. Napolitano, ACLU, No. 12-cv-2806 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2008), available at
https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/gayle-v-napolitano.
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mandatorily detained for prior crimes), shifted the burden to DHS to estab-
lish detention, and required de novo custody redeterminations every 90
days.187
Appointed counsel has historically not been provided to immigrant de-
tainees to challenge detention, nor to defend their underlying removal pro-
ceedings.l8 8 That said, DHS recently agreed to provide appointed counsel
to mentally ill detainees, pursuant to a federal court settlement. 189 Litiga-
tion is also pending to provide appointed counsel to children in removal
proceedings.190 In the political process, the Senate's 2013 legislation
would have provided appointed counsel in formal removal proceedings to
children, the mentally ill, and the "particularly vulnerable."191 Moreover,
New York City now provides counsel to any resident detained in formal
removal proceedings, with other municipalities exploring similar pro-
grams.192
Appellate review of the detention decision is provided to those detained
pre-removal order, although with a presumption of detention during appel-
late review.193 Appellate review of detention decisions is not provided to
arriving aliens nor those detained post-removal order (except via habeas in
federal court).
III.U.S. Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP") Civil Commitment: A Sur-
vey
In this section, I briefly survey the conditions and attendant processes of
187 S. 744, § 3717. § 3717(a) (requiring the DHS to demonstrate at a bond hearing that "no condi-
tions, including the use of alternatives to detention that maintain custody over the alien, will reasonably
assure the appearance of the alien as required and the safety of any other person and the community".).
188 Those in formal removal proceedings have a statutory right to have counsel present, but at no
cost to the government. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006 & Supp. 2011). Arriving aliens have no right to have
counsel present. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) (2009).
189 Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for
Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions, DEP'T OF JUSTICE
(Apr. 22, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2013/SafeguardsUnrepresentedlmmigrationDetainees.html; ACLU,
Federal Court Orders Legal Representation for Immigrant Detainees With Mental Disabilities, Apr. 23,
2013, available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/federal-court-orders-legal-representation-
immigrant-detainees-mental-disabilities.
190 Groups Sue Federal Government over Failure to Provide Legal Representation for Children,
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Jul. 9, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/groups-sue-
federal-govemment-over-failure-provide-legal-representation-children.
191 S. 744, § 3502.
192 Mark Noferi, Municipalities Help Advance Access to Counsel for Immigrants, Immigration
Impact (Aug. 13, 2014), available at http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/08/13/municipalities-help-
advance-access-to-counsel-for-immigrants/.
193 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.6(c), 1003.19(i) (2012); Raha Jorjani, Ignoring The Court's Order: The Au-
tomatic Stay In Immigration Detention Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REv. 89, 119 (2010).
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the SVP civil commitment system today, with a similar focus on recent re-
forms and their similarity to the immigration detention reforms described
earlier.
A.The Civil SVP Commitment Model
Conditions of confinement at SVP facilities, like those at immigration
detention facilities, currently appear quite mixed, but they are trending to-
wards improvement. On the ground, conditions in SVP facilities on aver-
age may be already closer to the Karnes civil model, although the devel-
opment of standards may lag behind ICE's recent efforts. Here, I survey
SVP confinement conditions, from available data and media reports, again
by using Dr. Schriro's categories of civil reform set out above.
Overarching Strategy and Standards
In SVP commitment, as with immigration detention, the more recent
trend is towards separate facilities from criminal jails or prisons (in New
York, Washington state, Virginia, Arizona, and California, for example). 194
Still, some civilly committed sex offenders are still held in actual prisons.
Indeed, federal sex offenders are solely held at the Federal Correctional In-
stitute in Butner, North Carolina, managed by Board of Prisons ("BOP")
officers and subject to BOP rules and regulations.195 Placements in correc-
tional facilities are particularly common in jurisdictions with recently en-
acted SVP commitment statutes. 196
Even in separate facilities, the default model is still round-the-clock con-
finement. 197 Indeed, each SVP committee has been adjudged dangerous as
194 Hannah Rappleye, America's Expensive Sex Offenders, SALON, Apr. 17, 2012, available at
http://www.salon.com/2012/04/17/americasexpensive sex offenders/. California, which civilly com-
mits the most SVPs, has built a new $388 million civil commitment facility with 1,500 beds. Id. See
also N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.10(e) (Consol. 2014) (requiring separation from correctional facility
inmates, even if housed on same grounds).
195 See Timms v. Johns, 700 F. Supp. 2d 764, 769-70 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (finding that SVP commit-
tee was subject to criminal punishment). Some states similarly incarcerate civil committees in actual
prisons. For example, New Jersey SVP committees live in barred cells originally built as the "adminis-
trative segregation" facility of the East Jersey State Prison in Avenel, NJ. Alves v. Main, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84761, 2012 WL 2339809 (D.N.J. June 19, 2012) (class action complaint challenging con-
ditions at New Jersey's Special Treatment Unit ("STU")).
196 Brian K. Holmgren, Sexually Violent Predator Statutes: Implications for Prosecutors and their
Communities, 32-JUN PROSECUTOR 20, 28 (1998).
197 Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/O4civil.html_[hereinaf-
ter Davey & Goodnough]; Minnesota Office Of The Legislative Auditor, Civil Commitment of Sex Of-
fenders 42 (March 2011), available at http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf (stating
that Minnesota committees receive an "all-or-nothing outcome," either an "expensive, high security
facility" or release to the community).
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a predicate for his commitment. Notwithstanding this perceived danger-
ousness, a minority of states have incorporated supervision outside the se-
cure facility, to varying degrees. Arizona and Washington have incorpo-
rated limited furlough programs depending on the success of treatment,
with varying degrees of personal supervision or GPS tracking bracelets.19 8
Texas operates an exclusively outpatient model, incorporating treatment
and case management with GPS monitoring and surveillance. 199 Its costs
are one-fifth that of inpatient treatment. 200 North Dakota provides outpa-
tient treatment for some, depending on the outcome of a risk assessment.201
New York has a two-track system, with either commitment to a secure fa-
cility or intensive community supervision, also depending on the outcome
of a risk assessment.2 02
Conditions of Confinement
Like the new Karnes model, some SVP commitment facilities have al-
ready incorporated less restrictive conditions of confinement, albeit with a
secure perimeter. Even dedicated civil commitment facilities have razor-
wire fences and guard stations.203 That said, in newer facilities, residents
typically do not wear uniforms and possess freedom of movement inside
the fence.204 Facility staff are not "guards." 205
Programs and Recreational Opportunities
SVP facilities have made even greater strides than immigration facilities
towards providing programs, resources, and recreational opportunities to
committees. This may be because SVP programs incorporate a treatment
paradigm into their incapacitative practices. In this vein, newer dedicated
198 Rappleye, supra note 194 (comparing the Minnesota model with Arizona's, which provides for
"Less Restrictive Alternative" program with supervised furloughs, GPS monitoring, and work release).
199 Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CAL. L. REV.
2093, 2124-2125 (2010).
200 Id. at 2125. See also New York City Bar Association, Statement on Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders: Senate Bill S6325 and Assembly Bill A09282 (2006), available at
www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Sex_Offender Stmt.pdf (discussing how community-based treatment and
effective monitoring could serve same purpose at far lower cost in dollars and civil liberties).
201 North Dakota Legislative Counsel Staff, Alternatives to Inpatient Civil Commitment of Sex
offenders (October 2006), www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/docs/pdf/79318.pdf
202 See New York State Office of Mental Health, Annual Report on the Implementation of Mental
Hygiene Law Article 3, 10 (July 2011),
http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/statistics/SOMTAReport_2010.pdf. 36.7% of SVPs have been
shunted to the lesser restrictive track. Id. at 3.
203 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 197.
204 Id.; Rappleye, supra note 194 (residents may "roam the inside of the facility relatively freely").
205 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 197.
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sex offender facilities provide recreational opportunities such as movie
nights and classes; a 20,000-book library, badminton courts, room for mu-
sic and art therapy facilities,2 06 weight rooms, a snack bar,207 and health
and social habit classes. 208 Visitation standards are unclear, though. Addi-
tionally, as noted, SVP facilities go beyond immigration facilities in
providing furloughs to encourage reintegration.
Oversight, Accountability and Transparency
SVP detention similarly evidences a trend towards particularized stand-
ards and greater oversight (although again, with mixed results on the
ground), and already incorporates a transparency that ICE historically has
lacked. There are neither nationalized standards for SVP civil commitment
nor model standards such as the ABA's recent immigration detention
standards, likely due to the novelty of SVP civil commitment.209 That said,
at least seven states that civilly commit SVPs have instituted standards such
as professional certification for individual treatment providers, best practice
guidelines for professionals, program certification, risk assessment, notifi-
cation, or registration.210 Some of these state standards are binding,2 11 un-
like immigration standards.
SVP oversight is improving as well. 212 For example, New York has a
specialized oversight office that monitors supervision and treatment plans
and detainee progress.213 Greater transparency is also provided through
various state reports that track the progress of committees. 214
The level of privatization of SVP commitment facilities is, to date, far
206 Id. (discussing California's facilities).
207 Office of Mental Health, St. Lawrence Psychiatric Center,
http://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/slpc/facility.htm (describing New York's St. Lawrence Psychiatric
Center).
208 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 197 (describing Pennsylvania classes such as "Athlete's
Foot," and "Proper Table Manners.").
209 Id. ("As sex offender commitment centers are neither prisons nor traditional mental health pro-
grams, no national oversight body or standards exist").
210 Minnesota Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Policy and Management Board Study,
www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/.../pdf/sexoffenderboard.pdf_(December 2000) (discussing how Col-
orado, Illinois, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin all have standards for sex
offender commitment).
211 Id.
212 Mary Prescott, Invasion of the Body Snatchers: Civil Commitment After Adam Walsh, 71 U.
PIr. L. REV. 839, 859 (2010) ("adequate oversight mechanisms remain critical").
213 Naomi J. Freeman & Noel C. Thomas, Presentation at the Sex Offender Civil Commitment in
Minnesota: Challenges and Opportunities Symposium (January 19, 2012) (presentation available at
http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/bsoet/).
214 See, e.g., New York State Annual Report, supra note 108; Minnesota Office of the Legislative
Auditor, supra note 197.
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less than that of immigration detention. Florida is the only state with a ful-
ly privatized SVP commitment facility. 215 GEO Group's "Geo Care" divi-
sion manages the Florida facility, with lower staffing levels and reduced
costs, after the previous private contract was discontinued for mismanage-
ment.216 Virginia considered privatizing its state-owned facility, but ulti-
mately rejected proposals because it found the state could provide better
services at less cost.217
B. Procedures Attending SVP Civil Commitment
The procedural safeguards for SVP civil commitment generally ap-
proach, although do not uniformly equal, the level of due process provided
to criminal defendants, and go far beyond that provided to immigration de-
tainees.218 Fifteen states statutorily provide for a jury trial at the commit-
ment hearing, 219 with eleven of those states requiring a unanimous deci-
sion.220 Eleven states require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
commit,221 while nine states and the federal government require clear and
215 Chris Kirkham, Private Prison Company May Take Over Virginia Sex Offender Center,
HUFFINGTON POST, July 16, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/16/private-
prisons-virginia-sex-offenders_n1672526.html.
216 Id.
217 Associated Press, Va. won't privatize sex offender treatment program, Richmond Times-
Dispatch (July 22, 2014), http://www.timesdispatch.com/va-won-t-privatize-sex-offender-treatment-
program/articleab95a5fa-372e-5f98-b906-00lf8813b853.html.
218 See generally, W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Win-
ship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM J. CRIM. L. 117 (2011).
219 ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 36-3707 (2014); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601 et. seq. (Deering
2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.916, 394.917 (West 2013); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/35 (2006); IOWA
CODE § 229A.7 (1) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A
(2014), In re Johnstone, 453 Mass. 544, 547 (2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.492, 632.495 (2013); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11 (2014); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §10.07(d), (f) (Consol. 2013); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-48-90, 44-48-100(A) (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.061(b)
(2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(B) (2009.); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060(1) (2009); WIS. STAT. §
980.05(2) (2013). See generally Jefferson C. Knighton, Daniel C. Murrie, Marcus T. Boccaccini &
Darrel B. Turner, How Likely Is "Likely to Reoffend" in Sex Offender Civil Commitment Trials?, 38
LAW & HUM. BEHAV, 293, 302 (2014).
220 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601 et. seq. (Deering 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917 (West
2013); IOWA CODE § 229A.7 (1) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 123A (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495 (2013); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d) (Consol.
2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(b)
(2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(B) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060(1) (2009). Five states,
and the federal government, do not require a jury trial. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(d), 4248(a) (2014); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §17a-498 (2013) (general commitment statute); MINN. STAT. § 253B.08, 09 (2013); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 30:4-27.28, 27.29 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2014); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
6403 (2014). The First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth federal Circuits have held no constitutional right to a
jury trial exists in civil commitment proceedings. See e.g. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197,
1206-07 (9th Cir. 1990); Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008); Poole
v. Goodno, 335 F.3d 705, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.
2010).
221 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 36-3701 (2014); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (Deering 2014);
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convincing evidence.222 The SVP commitment hearing is commonly pre-
ceded by a probable cause determination of dangerousness. 223
Appointed counsel is statutorily provided to indigent potential commit-
tees in every state and at the federal level. 224 Most states provide counsel at
all stages of the proceeding, including the probable cause hearing, 225 and
some states provide counsel upon the filing of a petition226 or at the psychi-
atric evaluation. 227 Some states provide counsel on appeal.228 The appoint-
ed counsel in most states is a specialized mental health defender, 229 alt-
hough Florida provides a criminal public defender, 230 and New York
provides representation by the criminal pro bono panel if specialized coun-
sel is unavailable. 231
All jurisdictions that provide trial-type hearings also provide a right to
present evidence and concomitant evidentiary rights.232 Judicial appeals are
provided under similar standards as to criminal appeals. 233 Once a final
commitment order is entered, commitment is typically indefinite, subject to
Iowa Code Ann. § 229A.7 (West 2013); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/35 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a10 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123 (2014) (see, e.g., Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass.
771, 783 (1996)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100 (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062
(2014); WASH. REV. CODE. § 71.09.060 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 980.05 (2013).
222 18 U.S.C.A. § 4247, §4248(d) (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-498 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.917 (West 2013); Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.495 (2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09 (2013); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-1209 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.24
(2012); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07 (Consol. 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-09 (2014); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6404 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908 (2009).
223 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6602, 6603 (Deering 2014) (providing for pre-hearing probable
cause determination). In the federal system, an ex parte certification suffices. Timms, 700 F. Supp. 2d
764 (requiring judicial determination of probable cause to justify continued detention), vacated on pro-
cedural grounds, 627 F.3d 525 (4th Cir. 2010). States commonly provide a time limit on pre-hearing
detention. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 253B.08 (2005) (requiring a trial within 90 days of filing of the commit-
ment petition). Federal law does not. United States v. Timms, 799 F. Supp. 2d 582, 596 (E.D.N.C.
2011).
224 See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) (2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006)'s procedures for appointed
representation of federal criminal defendants); see also 725. Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/25(c)(1) (2006) ("If the
person is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel").
225 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-80(C)(1) (2010).
226 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135-E:23 (2007).
227 N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.03(d) (Consol. 2011) (appointed counsel at the psychiatric evalua-
tion if first).
228 N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.13(c) (Consol. 2007).
229 See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.06(c) (Consol. 2012).
230 Fla. Stat. § 394.916(3); see, e.g., In re May, 975 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(explaining that under § 394.916(3) a person facing commitment is entitled to counsel during commit-
ment hearings at state expense)).
231 N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.06(c) (Consol. 2012).
232 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) (2006) (potential committee "shall be afforded an opportunity to
testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who appear at the hearing."); U.S. v. Edwards, 777 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995-96 (E.D.N.C. 2011)
(stating Brady evidentiary disclosures must be made in Walsh Act civil commitment proceedings).
233 See United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012).
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periodic review.234
IV.The Emerging Civil Detention Paradigm: A Criminally Incarcera-
tive, Lower Security Model With Increasing Process
From a comparison of immigration detention and SVP civil commit-
ment, two major trends emerge: (1) improved conditions, comparable to
lower-security criminal incarceration (and less restrictive in some aspects);
and (2) stronger procedural protections than in ordinary civil proceedings,
albeit still less than criminal protections. SVP commitment has further ad-
vanced towards fulfilling both trends. But in both systems, to the extent
tension exists between incarceration and the particular needs of detainees
owing to their noncriminal status, incarceration generally trumps. Inevita-
bly, in both systems, complaints have resulted that civil detention is merely
jail under a different name.235 Indeed, as the SVP civil commitment sys-
tem has already incorporated reforms that immigrant advocates are current-
ly advocating for,23 6 this comparison may cause reevaluation of advocates'
long-term goals.
A.Round-the-Clock Confinement With Lower Security, Improved Condi-
tions, and Greater Programmatic and Recreational Opportunities
The emerging civil detention paradigm still presumptively relies on
round-the-clock confinement within a secure perimeter-yet inside the pe-
rimeter, with lower security, improved conditions and greater programmat-
ic opportunities, at least for those detainees classified as lower-security.
Still, incapacitation remains the primary goal in both regimes. Thus, in
terms of the deprivation of liberty imposed, the civil detention paradigm
still most closely resembles criminal incarceration. So long as those con-
fined cannot leave, they and their families suffer the same collateral ef-
234 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e) (2006).
235 See Rapplee, supra note 194 (lawyer litigating conditions said, "As a person off the street you
walk in and think, my goodness, this is certainly a prison"); see also Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters,
Trying to Make Immigrant Detention Less Like Prison, NPR.ORG (Mar. 14, 2012)
http://m.npr.org/news/front/148538183?singlePage--true (quoting ACLU-Texas director describing
Karnes "It's a prison. It's a clean, nice-looking prison ... If it walks like a duck..."); Puthoopparam-
bil, Maina-Ahlberg & Bjerneld Soorej, supra note 112, (Swedish detainees, in specialized facility oper-
ated by civil servants, without uniforms and with cellphone and Internet access, called it a "prison with
extra flavours").
236 See e.g. Epstein & Acer, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 10 (arguing
for conditions reforms); Ahilan Arulanantham, American Civil Liberties Union, Hearing, Senate Judici-
ary Committee, Building an Immigration System Worthy of American Values, (Mar. 20, 2013) (arguing
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fects-loss of work and resultant economic impacts, loss of personal con-
tact,237 psychological harm on the individual detained,238 and less ability to
meaningfully participate in legal proceedings, whether instant or parallel
proceedings. 239 (Even if counsel is provided, detention would still impact
detainees' ability to participate in proceedings, likely producing a higher
chance of a negative outcome).24 0
In immigration detention, along these lines, ICE's recent standards do
not depart from the round-the-clock incarceration model embodied in com-
parable criminal standards.2 4 1 The reforms envisioned in the latter catego-
ries Dr. Schriro identified-conditions of confinement, programs and rec-
reational opportunities, and oversight and accountability-have not carried
over to the first category, overarching strategy and standards, in which the
model remains four walls and a locked door.242 This is certainly true given
current practices, but would be true even if ICE PBNDS detention stand-
ards were fully implemented. And this is despite indications that immigra-
tion detainees pose comparatively less public safety risk than criminal de-
tainees, 243 and no more flight risk, at least. 24
Thus, the civil detention model still resembles jail. The similarity is par-
ticularly evidenced by the fact that both systems subjugate their uniquely
237 Alschuler, supra note 35, at 517.
238 Section IC, supra.
239 See Rogerson, supra note 141; Accessing Justice, supra note 142, at 374.
240 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 76, at 555 (summarizing criminal studies that detail nega-
tive impacts of detention on case outcomes).
241 See Brittney Nystrom, Promise of Better Detention Conditions Must be Followed by Action,
National Immigration Forum Blog (March 1, 2012), http://immigrationforum.org/blog/display/blog-
promise-of-better-detention-conditions-must-be-followed-by-action ("the new changes won't address
the fundamental contradiction of immigration detention centers operating like correctional institu-
tions.").
242 Kalhan, supra note 17, at 24 (stating that the government's reform proposals "target excessive
conditions of confinement but leave other excessive practices intact.").
243 Schriro noted that the "demeanor" of immigration detainees is different from criminal detain-
ees, with most immigration detainees seeking "repatriation or relief," exercising "exceptional restraint,"
and having a "low propensity for violence." Schriro Report at 4, 21. In 2009, her survey found that
only II percent of immigration detainees had committed violent crimes. Id. at 2. Separately, Schriro
has noted that the immigration detainee population has "appreciably well-developed" life skills, being
more likely to have come from "intact families," with "jobs," "families with minors," and a "stake in
the community"--as she put it, "more diversity than you would see in the criminal justice system."
Human Rights First, Dialogues on Detention: What is "Civil" Detention? at 0:49-4:57 (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-QM7zZe7I 1OM (comments by Dora Schriro).
244 Recent studies of U.S. immigrants in alternatives to detention have showed extremely high
compliance rates. See Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, THE
RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 130 (Jan. 2013) (in fiscal year
2010, about 94 percent of U.S. alternatives to detention participants appeared at their immigration hear-
ings), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/researchlimmigration-enforcement-united-states-
rise-formidable-machinery; VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE
INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ii (2000) (90 percent of supervised
participants appeared in immigration court), available at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/INS-finalreport.pdf.
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civil aims to the incapacitative rationale-the one goal that civil detention
shares with criminal incarceration. 245 Immigration detention has the dual
goal of preventing flight before deportation, which can be adequately ad-
dressed through less restrictive measures than incarceration. 246 SVP com-
mitment regimes have the dual goal of treatment and eventual rehabilita-
tion, which would be better furthered by wider use of supervised release,
furloughs and outpatient programs. Yet both systems, for the most part, es-
chew those alternatives in favor of incapacitation behind a locked door.247
And programs designed to meet the uniquely civil needs of the population,
whether access to pending proceedings, or access to treatment, are typically
provided only to the extent they do not frustrate incapacitation. 248 When
the shared criminal goal takes precedence over civil goals, it is hard to
identify a meaningful role that the "civil" label plays.
This is not to say that detention reforms to date have been valueless to
detainees. Indeed, Schriro has stated that immigrant detainees' "conditions
of detention should be at least the same and never worse than individuals
who are being held on criminal charges," and effectuating that "would im-
mediately raise the bar in so many different ways." 249 Implementation of
the ICE PBNDS would further this goal, as would implementation of the
ABA standards, even further. But, it raises the question of whether the civ-
il label of reform has value.
The expressive value of detention conditions reform termed "civil" ap-
pears to be no different than the expressive value of criminal incarceration.
Law has expressive value, as many have set out,250 as does its enforce-
ment.251 On the one hand, both the Administration's recent immigration de-
tention reforms and state SVP commitment practices appear largely to be
245 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, Nora Demleitner noted the "ease
with which civil instruments can be used to achieve incapacitative goals." Demleitner, supra note 92, at
1633.
246 See FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 70, at 10.
247 For example, the U.S. interprets INA § 236(c), which mandates that the government "take into
custody" certain criminal aliens, to equate "custody" with incarcerative detention, rather than less re-
strictive forms of custody such as electronic monitoring or supervised release, which U.S. criminal sys-
tems routinely employ. Id. at 24-25. See also Legomsky, supra note 18, at 541 (arguing that public
safety concern primarily animates mandatory detention).
248 Cf Demleitner, supra note 92, at 1634-35.
249 University of Florida Center for Latin American Studies, Loyola University Conference: Im-
prisoned, Forgotten, and Deported: Immigration Detention, Advocacy, and the Faith Community at
1:05 (Jan. 18, 2012), httv://www.voutube.com/watch?v=37lnDqyjrSo&feature=youtu.be.
250 See e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI.
L.REv. 943 (1995); Murray Edelman, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
251 See e.g., Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REv. 858 (2014); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 533 (2001).
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well-intentioned efforts to put into practice the legal distinction between
jail, which is used pursuant to a criminal process, and civil detention, which
is not. But in their implementation, these efforts have functioned more as
an expressive pun (i.e. "more civil" detention) rather than a meaningful le-
gal norm. 252
Moreover, because the physical structure of civil detention still resem-
bles jail, the expressed message still remains one connoting criminality of
the detainees, subsuming government efforts to express reform.253 Physi-
cal structures express messages as well, as both criminal 254 and immigra-
tion255 scholars have articulated. And since American society most strong-
ly associates incarceration with criminal punishment, as Dan Kahan has set
out, 256 I posit here that so long as civil detention in locked, secure facilities
like jails remains widespread, its use will expressively connote criminality,
even with conditions reform. 257 As Schriro noted, "Immigration Detention
and Criminal Incarceration detainees tend to be seen by the public as com-
parable." 258 This is all the more troubling because theoretically, civil de-
tention should not reflect expressive messages, as its aim should be preven-
tion, not to communicate the moral condemnation that accompanies
criminal punishment. 259 But, the expressive message connoted by incar-
ceration may help explain why civil detention has nearly always been ap-
plied to perceived "dangerous others." 260
ABA model immigration standards do point the way beyond the locked
door, in two ways. The first is the ABA standards' comparative embrace of
252 Cf Demleitner, supra note 92, at 1631 (calling civil framing of SVP commitment laws
"forced").
253 See also Section V. B.
254 See e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 384 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996);
Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for
the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2191 (2001).
255 Several scholars have explored the expressive message of the U.S. southern border fence, for
example. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 147, 161-62, 169-70 (2012);
Mary Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short: Fantasy and Fetishes as Gap-Fillers in
Border Regulation, 42 LAW & Soc. REV. 701, 711 (2008); Linda Bosniak, Between the Domestic and
the Foreign: Centering the Nation's Edges, 24 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 271, 276 (2007).
256 Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. at 591 ("Imprisonment is the
punishment of choice in American jurisdictions.... for those who commit serious criminal offenses, the
law strongly prefers one form of suffering--the deprivation of liberty--to the near exclusion of all oth-
ers."). See also Kalhan, supra note 24, at 42 (explaining that civil immigration detention is more aptly
termed "immcarceration").
257 See also Mark Noferi, Mandatory Immigration Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen
Presumption of Dangerousness, IMMIGRATION DETENTION, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming
2014), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context-mnoferi. Cf
Mcleod, supra note 19, at
258 See SCHRIRO REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
259 Cf Kahan, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. at 598-600.
260 Resnik, supra note 32, at 663.
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furloughs for "humanitarian reasons," including home visits for those de-
tained at length and for parallel proceedings, with supervision or electronic
tracking if necessary. 26 1 Some states with SVP commitment already incor-
porate furloughs with supervision to a greater degree, providing a model
for immigration detention practices. Increased use of immigration deten-
tion furloughs would better recognize the more stable nature of immigrant
detainees' lives outside the facility-at least in facilitating family contact,
if not stable work. Yet ICE currently lags even behind criminal justice
practices in providing furloughs.2 62
Second, and further, the ABA standards implicitly may recommend qual-
itatively different facilities without 24/7 "controlled access" (only "if nec-
essary"), as part of a "continuum of strategies." 263 Here again, SVP com-
mitment is further ahead, with Texas, New York, and North Dakota all
employing an outpatient model to varying degrees.
These two strategies differ in their default presumption. With furloughs,
the presumption is jail, but temporary release with supervision for good be-
havior; in nonsecure facilities, the presumption is release with supervision,
but redetention for violations. For example, European countries more
widely use "nonsecure" or "semi-secure" immigration facilities. 264 Nonse-
cure facilities or release would also likely lead to a lesser expressive conno-
tation of criminality.
B. More Robust Criminal-Like Due Process Protections
Secondly, the emerging civil detention paradigm is marked (perhaps
ironically) by robust due process protections approaching that of a criminal
trial. Again, SVP civil commitment is further towards the model than im-
migration detention, here because its population is largely comprised of cit-
izens, regarding whom there has been little question that rights apply. 265
261 ABA Standards, supra note 25, § X.B.3, 4.
262 Furloughs have long been a part of criminal incarceration practices, under the theory that fur-
loughs foster rehabilitation and eventual integration into society. See Dusty Collier, Note, The "Ideal"
Pendulum Swing: From Rhetoric to Reality, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 175, 185 (2008) (describing sup-
port for furloughs as part of the criminal movement towards "indeterminate sentencing"); Michael M.
O'Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory Of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1247 (2011). The comparative absence of furloughs in immigration detention may be because immigra-
tion detention presumes eventual deportation, and thus immigration authorities are historically uncon-
cemed with rehabilitation. Cf Hemandez, supra note 21, at 1401 (arguing that rehabilitation is inappo-
site to immigration detention because rehabilitation requires remorse).
263 ABA Standards, supra note 25, at 4, § II.C & n. I and 12, § IV.B.8.
264 Alice Edwards, Measures of First Resort: Alternatives to Immigration Detention in Compara-
tive Perspective, 7 THE EQUAL RIGHTS REVIEW 117, 118 (2011).
265 Cf Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not The People: The Changing Rights Of Immigrants
In The United States, 44 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 367 (2013).
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Still, as courts impose procedural due process protections on immigration
proceedings, that state of affairs is likely to change. 266 Indeed, although
some see legislation for appointed counsel in immigration proceedings as
politically unlikely, 267 in part due to immigrants' historically disfavored
status, Congress provided appointed counsel to SVP committees with little
debate and no evident backlash.268
That said, the provision of procedural safeguards, I posit, affirms that the
proceedings involve criminal-like stakes, 269 if not that the litigant is crimi-
nal-like himself, in our U.S. society that has come to associate appointed
counsel with the criminal process. 270 Process has an expressive value,271
as well as a political component and political impact, as William Stuntz and
others have noted.272 Expressively, there is nothing inherently "civil" about
appointed counsel-perhaps more the opposite.2 73 Providing appointed
266 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution Of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates
For Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1631-32 (1992).
267 Carla Reyes, Access to Counsel in Removal Proceedings: A Case Study for Exploring the Le-
gal and Societal Imperative to Expand the Civil Right to Counsel, 17 D.C. L. REV. 131, 154 (2014)
(calling federal legislation for appointed counsel "not politically feasible"); Erin B. Corcoran, Bypass-
ing Civil Gideon. A Legislative Proposal to Address the Rising Costs and Unmet Legal Needs of Un-
represented Immigrants, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 643 (2012) (arguing for legislative proposal for qualified
non-lawyer representatives, on cost-efficiency grounds).
268 The Congressional Record is silent as to any debate on appointed counsel. See 18 U.S.C.
§4247(d) (2006). In this vein, Congress also provided Al Qaeda military detainees appointed counsel
with little evident backlash. E.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 125 STAT.
1298 §1024(b)(2) (2011). See generally Mark Noferi, Deportation Without Representation,
SLATECOM (May 15, 2013),
http://www.slate.con/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2013/05/the-immigration bill shouldi
nclude the right to alawyer.html#.
269 Indeed, under the Supreme Court's Constitutional rulings to date, counsel has generally only
been provided in civil proceedings when liberty is denied, and not in other civil proceedings with high
stakes. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (not requiring counsel in paren-
tal termination proceedings, citing "the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed
counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty"). Others have argued,
though, that as states blur the line between civil and criminal proceedings, with civil proceedings in-
creasingly taking on the characteristics of criminal matters (serious consequences in an adversarial pro-
cess against the government), the formalistic line between appointed counsel in criminal proceedings
and not in civil proceedings is becoming anachronistic. Chad Flanders and Alexander Muntges, The
Trumpet Player's Lament. Rethinking The Civil Gideon Movement, 17 U.D.C. L. REV. 28 (2014).
270 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) ("rMirandal warnings have become
part of our national culture"). For similar reasons, a public relations firm recently hired to advocate for
Central American immigrant children advised against making arguments for counsel that referenced the
criminal right to appointed counsel. The firm advised, "Child refugees should not be described like
criminals on trial. Due process is a powerful concept but language about trials, judges and lawyers can
invoke associations with crime, and suggest that refugees have a burden of guilt. Consider softer lan-
guage ('these children deserve a chance to tell their story, with full due process')." Hattaway Commu-
nications, Message Landscape: Child Refugees (Aug. 2014) (on file with author).
271 See Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 FLA. L. REV. 405, 419-420 (1987).
272 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution Of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 790-807 (2006).
273 Notably, as civil right to counsel becomes more entrenched in American society, this may
change, and Americans may not necessarily associate appointed counsel with the criminal process. Cf
John Pollock, The Case Against Case-By-Case: Courts Identifying Categorical Rights to Counsel in
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counsel to immigration detainees, for example, would essentially put civil
detainees on par with most criminal pretrial detainees, at least in one re-
spect. Indeed, providing appointed counsel to immigrants may be more po-
litically viable than "civil" detention conditions improvements, 274 if coun-
sel might expressively affirm a perception of immigrant criminality in the
public eye.
All this is not to say that appointed counsel would not be enormously
valuable to those who receive it. Appointed counsel would almost certain-
ly reduce the incidence of pretrial detention, at least in formal removal pro-
ceedings where a detainee, now represented, could challenge bond at a
hearing. 275 As to final deportation outcomes, immigration studies show a
marked disparity between represented and unrepresented detainees, 276 and
counsel would likely save thousands each year from deportation. 277
But, appointed counsel without parallel substantive reforms to the harsh-
ness of immigration law-i.e. deportations with detention and without dis-
cretion-may result in a system that is fair but not just. As critics have al-
leged of our modem criminal system, 278 the immigration system might
become a system with many lawyers and much incarceration. William
Stuntz argued that in the criminal realm, court-ordered procedural protec-
tions led to a decades-long legislative backlash of substantive overcriminal-
ization.279 It is unclear if a similar dynamic would occur in immigration,
Basic Human Needs Civil Cases, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 781-84 (2013) (for example, 44 states and the
District of Columbia appoint counsel in parental termination proceedings, as of spring 2013).
274 See Section V.B. Further, the growing trend to provide procedural safeguards to preventive
detention raises the question of the limits of procedural due process to render preventive detention sub-
stantively or morally fair. To provide an extreme example, no one has credibly argued that providing
appointed counsel in the Korematsu detention process, to more accurately determine whether one was
of "Japanese ancestry," would have saved those proceedings from criticism. Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944). 1 will explore this topic in future research.
275 Dr. John Montgomery, NERA Economic Consulting, Cost of Counsel in Immigration: Eco-
nomic Analysis of Proposal Providing Public Counsel to Indigent Persons Subject to Immigration Re-
moval Proceedings 17 (May 28, 2014), available at http://www.nera.com/67_8564.htm, citing Doug-
las L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster, & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and
Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2002) (empirical study showed
that representation at criminal bail hearings improved results for defendants and reduced pretrial deten-
tion).
276 NYIRS, Accessing Justice, supra note 142, at 363-64 (18 percent of detainees with representa-
tion succeeded, compared to 3 percent without representation).
277 Montgomery, Cost of Counsel in Immigration, supra note 275, at 21, 24 (estimating that
providing appointed counsel in formal removal proceedings nationwide would reduce deportations by
15 percent among those detained throughout their case, and 6.5 percent among those detained but re-
leased, thus avoiding nearly 15,000 deportations each year).
278 McLeod, supra note 19, at 168-73, citing William Stuntz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). See also McLeod at 168 (arguing that immigration enforcement structurally
reinforces racial hierarchies), citing Michelle Alexander, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96-97 (2012).
279 Stuntz, COLLAPSE at 792-93; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519-20 (2001). Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez raise the possibility of
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and the potential interplays require greater examination than space permits
here. But, it suffices to say that procedural protections such as appointed
counsel, while benefiting detainees in the current system, without more
may also have the unintended consequence of legitimizing as "fair" a sub-
stantively unfair system. 280
Allegra McLeod argues more fundamentally for "a shift in the governing
crime-centered conceptual and enforcement framework"-specifically, one
that "legislatively narrowed the scope, reduced the harshness, and revised
the crime-centered enforcement model in the immigration domain." 28 1
Correspondingly, I argue here that in the long-term, dramatically reducing
the number of immigration detainees, and reducing mandatory deportation
grounds, may be preferable to providing lawyers to several hundred thou-
sand detainees a year to litigate impossible cases. And if the solution is to
take immigration law out of its currently "crime-centered framework" in
politics and discourse, 282 the ultimate answer may be to drastically reduce
detention, with its expressive message of criminality, rather than only to
provide appointed counsel, potentially with its own implicit message of
criminality.
C. Use of Private Detention Facilities
I also make an additional policy point regarding the privatization of civil
detention facilities. The new "civil detention paradigm" suffers from defi-
cient institutional knowledge, standards, and oversight due to the novelty
and unclear nature of civil detention. Both the immigration detention and
SVP commitment systems have made strides towards specialized standards
and oversight. But particularly in the immigration context, the lack of in-
stitutional knowledge has contributed to a reliance on private prison and
detention companies that may potentially countermand any advances in
conditions from specific standards and increased oversight. 283
a similar dynamic in the immigration system. Adam Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, The President and Im-
migration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 529 (2009).
280 McLeod, supra note 19, at 173 ("a rights revolution in immigration procedure may fall short in
reorienting substantive immigration law"); id at 170 ("As it has in the criminal law context, an immi-
gration procedural rights revolution may have the unintended consequence of legitimizing the increas-
ingly harsh substantive immigration law by offering, in principle, a panoply of robust procedural pro-
tections seldom enjoyed by defendants in practice and against which harsh substantive laws can be
defended.");
281 McLeod, supra note 19, at 172-73.
282 Id.
283 See Improving Conditions, supra note 4, at 1442 (explaining that the ICE "has considerable
expertise and infrastructure in the area of immigration enforcement but not in immigrant detention").
SVP commitment has relied less on private facilities, although similar incentives to do so are present.
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Private prison companies possess incentives to maximize profits by
providing substandard, less expensive care to inmates, and keeping facili-
ties chronically understaffed and undertrained. 284 For example, one study
found that private prison employees receive 58 hours less training and re-
ceive about $5,327 less in annual salary than their public counterparts.2 85
Another Department of Justice study found that privately operated facilities
have significantly lower staffing levels compared to publicly operated pris-
ons, leading to a higher rate of assaults on staff and inmates.2 86 The same
study found "squalid and inhumane living conditions" and "exploitation of
the inmates" in private facilities, caused in part by a lack of contract super-
vision. 287
Oversight over private facilities appears more challenging, in part be-
cause ICE's only remedy is to terminate a contract (which it does rare-
ly), 288 and in part because private companies are not subject to Freedom of
Information Act requests. 289 Oversight of private companies is not theoret-
ically impossible, as Alexander Volokh has pointed out. 290 But practically
speaking, ICE has yet to exercise effective oversight over private facilities
in the immigration context. 29 1
Given this, it is incongruous at best and counterproductive at worst that
ICE seeks to implement its new civil detention reforms entirely through
private companies. 292 If the trend continues, without meaningful oversight
on contracts, the profit incentive on the ground may countermand any
structural advances that might encourage better conditions of confinement.
284 See, e.g., Kalhan, supra note 24, at 52. See also Martin, supra note 164, at 1481; The Influence
of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, DET. WATCH NETWORK
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons (last visited March 12, 2012).
285 See Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector Prisons-A Comparison
of Select Characteristics, 68(1) FED. PROB. 27, 29 (2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2004-06/prisons.html.
286 See James Austin & Garry Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons, MONOGRAPH 1,
xi., available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/l 81249.pdf.
287 See Mason, supra note 10, at 12 ("[T]he emphasis on cutting costs to ensure profits can lead to
understaffing and employees with less training, lower pay and benefits, and higher turnover rates. This
has made cases of violence, abuse, negligence and substandard healthcare more common").
288 Sthanki, supra note 21, at 465.
289 See, e.g., id. at 16 (demonstrating how private companies exacerbate the lack of transparency
in the already-opaque immigration detention system, such as when ICE never provided report authors a
complete and accurate list of private facilities after months of requests); see also id. at 8-9 (explaining
how this would change if pending Senate legislation passed); see also Mark Noferi, Appointed Counsel,
supra note 42.
290 Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Pris-
ons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1871, 1886-1890 (2002) (arguing that performance of private prisons
could rise with more robust standards, increased transparency and oversight, and legitimate competi-
tion).
291 Sthanki, supra note 21, at 456, 465.
292 Mason, supra note 10, at 5 (ICE seems "prepared to primarily rely on private companies to
address concerns" regarding conditions).
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V. Looking Forward: Assessing the Civil Detention Model
In sum, it appears that the "civil" label given U.S. immigration de-
tention reforms to date has little substantive meaning, either regarding the
deprivation of liberty, or the expressed message of civil detention. If any-
thing, the analysis here illustrates the continuing asymmetric incorporation
of criminal norms-and now reforms-into immigration law.293 Viewed
this way, conditions and process improvements in immigration law are
simply decades behind their incorporation into criminal law.294
That said, this analysis begs the question of what truly "civil" detention
would entail. Looking forward, I preliminarily offer the first a definitional
framework for a system of civil custody and supervision-a more accurate
term than "civil detention"-and provide recommendations to enact it into
U.S. immigration law. As a postscript, I also explore the political viability
of civil detention reform as conceptualized and implemented to date.
A. A Civil Immigration Detention Framework: Less, Shorter, and a Differ-
ent Nature of Detention
Ultimately, rather than "civil detention," the more pertinent inquiry
would be the overall framework of "civil custody and supervision," with
detention as one part. The guiding maxim would be, as the Supreme Court
stated, "[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to [crimi-
nal] trial or without [criminal] trial is the carefully limited exception." 295
The aim would be prevention, rather than total incapacitation as an as-
sumed default. The legal test would be the proportionality of the ends
used, and attendant deprivation of liberty, to the particular aims of the par-
ticular laws. 296 Such a proportionality inquiry might first, identify and
293 Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Crim-
inal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:
Immigrants, Crime, And Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) ("Immigration law today
is clothed with so many attributes of criminal law that the line between them has grown indistinct");
Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV, at 1288(describing "collaborative relationship"
between criminal and immigration enforcement authorities that "undermines the criminal-civil divide").
294 See Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the Bureaucrat-
ization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE L. REV. 433 (2004)
(describing advancement of prison conditions through litigation and other means); Ingrid Eagly, Gide-
on's Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2305 (2013) (summarizing development of criminal right to coun-
sel before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
295 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
296 See FLYNN, supra note 33, at 4 (assessing whether detention practices are proportionate to the
aims of immigration enforcement by examining the type of detention centre). See also Resnik, supra
note 32, at 584 ("legally diverse" preventive detention systems "must distinguish among and classify
detainees to justify why a particular subset is to be confined in more restrictive conditions than others");
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place along a spectrum the relevant deprivation of liberty; second, ascertain
whether that deprivation of liberty is sufficiently tailored to the relevant
civil or criminal ends; and third, whether the deprivation is grossly dispro-
portionate.297
To give more concrete detail to the kind of regime that would meet such
a proportionality inquiry, converting immigration detention into civil cus-
tody and supervision would likely entail three reforms: (1) less incidence of
detention, with (2) shorter duration, and (3) a different nature of liberty re-
strictions, outside the traditional 24-7 secure facility model.
Incidence: If immigration detention were truly tailored to its goals of
preventing flight risk and danger, there would almost surely be far less of
it.298 There is no comprehensive study assessing the actual risk that immi-
grant detainees pose. But the current immigration system detains individu-
als dramatically more frequently than the criminal pretrial system, its clos-
est structural analog, even though it stretches credulity that immigration
arrestees could be that much more inclined than criminal arrestees to ab-
scond or commit crimes. 299
For example, a New York study found that from 2005 to 2010, ICE dis-
cretionarily denied bail to 71 percent of arrestees, mandatorily denied bail
to 9 percent, and set extremely high bonds for the rest, such that over half
of them could not afford release. Contrastingly, in New York criminal
courts, 1% of criminal defendants are held without bail; 31% receive bond,
with 80% of those bond settings $1,000 or below; and 68% are released on
recognizance. 300 The proportions of detention incidence are nearly re-
versed. Meanwhile, the available data indicates that immigration arrestees
are no more likely to abscond immigration proceedings than criminal ar-
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 415,
416-18 (2012) (discussing proportionality and immigration law generally); Kalhan, supra note 24, at 49
(calling immigration detention a "quasi-punitive regime far out of alignment with immigration custo-
dy's permissible purposes").
297 Wishnie at 420. This might resemble what William Stuntz recommended in the criminal
realm--"some sort of constitutional proportionality principle with bite." William Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEM. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 30 (1996). See also Sherry F.
Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All Other Rights, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 781, 799 (1994) (taking issue with other theories governing proportionality review of substantive
criminal law).
298 See Kalhan, supra note 24, at 48 ("existing policies and practices almost certainly have caused
over detention); Das, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. at 145 (arguing for less ("optimal") detention from an institu-
tional design perspective); Hemandez, supra note 21, at 1412 (reforms would be "likely to lead to less
detention than we experience today").
299 ICE's data seems to recognize this as well. As Hernandez noted, an early risk assessment that
ICE performed on its detention population showed that on a single day in May 2011, ICE classified
only 19 percent of its detainees as high-risk. Hemandez, supra note 21, at 1412-13, citing HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS at 2.
300 Occhiogrosso-Schwartz, Insecure Communities, at 8-11.
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restees in criminal proceedings, 301 and are less likely to commit crimes.302
To better tailor detention to its goals, Congress (and DHS, where admin-
istratively possible) could first eliminate mandatory detention provi-
sions.303 Yet discretionary detention still comprises the bulk of detention
decisions. Shifting the burden on these decisions to DHS, rather than the
noncitizen, would likely reduce incidences of discretionary detention. S.
744 provided an example, but DHS could also implement solutions admin-
istratively.304
Additionally, ICE nationally deployed a risk assessment tool in 2013,
which assesses flight and public safety risk and recommends detention and
release. 305 Theoretically, the tool has potential to reduce incidence of de-
tention, as it has in some criminal justice jurisdictions. 306 That said, ICE
has not made public data on the risk assessment tool, and it is unclear if the
301 In the 1990s, before the advent of electronic tracking devices and supervision techniques, stud-
ies found that nearly 80 percent of deportable "criminal aliens" appeared for hearings. U.S. Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Criminal Aliens in the United States, S.Rep. No. 104-48 (1995).
In 2009, in the 75 largest U.S. counties, 83 percent of adult felony defendants who were released pretri-
al attended all court hearings (virtually all with lawyers, as well). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 - Statistical Tables, p. 21 Table
18, (December 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf. Moreover, in criminal proceed-
ings, studies show a defendant's likelihood of failing to appear is "statistically unaffected by... immi-
gration status." Allyson Theophile, Pretrial Risk Assessment and Immigration Status: A Precarious
Intersection, FEDERAL PROBATION 73:2 (2009).
302 In criminal proceedings, for example, released unauthorized immigrants were re-arrested pre-
trial at lower rates than US citizens-0.0 to 3.2 percent, compared to 1.9 to 4.5 percent. Theophile at
73:2
303 Congress could amend 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(b)(iii)(IV) so that detention in expedited removal
"may," not "shall," be used pending a credible fear determination. In addition, DHS could allow parole
for asylum seekers in expedited removal arriving between ports of entry, to mitigate detention after
credible fear is found. See Section I.A., supra. DHS could administratively reinterpret 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c), which mandates "custody," to allow for electronic supervision. Memorandum from the Amer-
ican Immigration Lawyers Association to David Martin (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=94. DHS could also administratively reinterpret reinstatement of re-
moval provisions to allow for release for those pursuing asylum. Gilman, Realizing Liberty, 36
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. at 312. Moreover, Congress could repeal the "bed quota" which requires 34,000
detention spaces, and exacerbates detention as a default. A recent DHS report found that individual
field offices vary detention practices based on the quota. DHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ICE's
RELEASE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINEES (2014), available at
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2014/OIG_14-116_Aug 14.pdf.
304 See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2012).
305 Robert Koulish & Mark Noferi, Unlocking immigrant detention reform, BALTIMORE SUN (Feb.
20, 2013), available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-immigrant-detention-
20130220,0,5653483.story; Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, Boost protections for detained immigrants,
NEWARK STAR-LEDGER (May 1, 2013), available at
http://blog.nj.com/njvguest blog/2013/05/boostprotections for detained.html. The 2011 ICE
PBNDS standards also incorporated a risk assessment, but only to determine the level of custody, not
the detention decision itself. ICE PBNDS, supra note 6, at 62-78.
306 See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, USING TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE PRETRIAL
SERVICES: CURRENT APPLICATIONS AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES (2012), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/Featured%20Resources%2Documents/PJI%20USNG%20TECHNOLOGY%
20TO%20ENHANCE%20PRETRIAL%20SERVICES%20%282012%29.pdf. See also SCHRIRO
REPORT, supra note 4, at 17, 20-21 (recommending adoption of risk assessment).
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tool has reduced incidence of detention in practice. 30 7
Duration: Moreover, when detention is imposed, it is often imposed for
prolonged periods, sometimes years. 308 At some point, prolonged deten-
tion ceases to be proportional to its aims. 30 9 Even shorter periods of deten-
tion of days, weeks or months can be extremely impactful on a detainee's
life. 310 For example, those seeking asylum through reinstatement of re-
moval proceedings are detained on average for 1 11 days until receiving a
"reasonable fear" interview, 3 11 which can cause serious trauma to one
whom has been persecuted.
The U.S. could impose time limits as European countries have. 312
France, for example, which receives the third-most asylum seekers after the
US and Canada, limits short-term detention to 48 hours and longer-term de-
tention to 32 days.3 13 Time limits could be achieved through legislation or
administrative action. S. 744, for example, required a detention decision
within 72 hours, 3 14 and similar legislation could amend expedited removal
and reinstatement provisions. That said, DHS could also self-impose limits
through regulation.
Nature of Detention: More broadly, ICE could change the nature of its
detention facilities, to not require constant incapacitation. Notably, nonse-
cure (a.k.a. "open") and semi-secure facilities, as used in Europe, 3 15 would
change the physical nature of U.S. detention, to more narrowly tailor a lib-
erty deprivation to the government's goals and the individual's circum-
stances. This would be part of a genuine spectrum of restrictions, ranging
from detention on the most restrictive end to nonsecure or semi-secure fa-
cilities, home arrest, electronic tracking, supervision, and at the other end
307 Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, ICE Risk Assessments: From Mass Detention to Mass Supervi-
sion? CRIMMIGRATION.COM (May 16, 2013), http://crimmigration.com/2013/05/16/ice-risk-
assessments-from-mass-detention-to-mass-supervision.aspx. Human rights advocates criticized an early
version of the risk assessment tool for being over-weighted towards detention. LIRS, UNLOCKING
LIBERTY, supra note 79, at 21. Robert Koulish and I are analyzing samples of risk assessments received
through the Freedom of Information Act, and plan to release results.
308 Kalhan, supra note 24, at 49.
309 Cf Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-93.
310 Alschuler, supra note 35, at 517.
311 Kate Linthicum, Immigrants seeking U.S. protection spend months in detention, suit says, L. A.
TIMES, (April 17, 2014), available at http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-asylum-delays-20140418-
story.html.
312 Robyn Sampson & Grant Mitchell, Global Trends in Immigration Detention and Alternatives
to Detention: Practical, Political and Symbolic Rationales, I JOURNAL OF MIGRATION & HUMAN
SECURITY 97, 100 (2013), available at http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/14.
313 GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, France Detention Profile (2009),
http://www.globaidetentionproject.org/countries/europe/france/introduction.html.
314 S. 744 § 3717(a).
315 Alice Edwards, Measures of First Resort: Alternatives to Immigration Detention in Compara-
tive Perspective, 7 THE EQUAL RIGHTS REVIEW 117, 118 (2011).
2014]
580 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS& ECONOIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:3
release on recognizance.316
Michael Flynn's helpful typology of immigration custody environments
defines a "nonsecure" facility as one that does not physically restrain a per-
son from leaving at will, but imposes redetention for violations. 317 Indeed,
Flynn calls a "nonsecure" facility "by definition not a detention facility."318
That is precisely the point, regarding the arguments here. A truly civil de-
tention system, more tailored to its goals, should detain less.
Flynn thus distinguishes "secure" facilities which deprive liberty - even
where detainees are allowed to move about the facility once inside-from
"non-secure" facilities, such as immigration reception centers, which do not
physically restrain a person from leaving by guards, barbed-wire fences, or
locked doors.319 Id. Italy, for example, uses nonsecure facilities for asy-
lum seekers,320 and Belgium uses nonsecure residences for families.321
A "semi-secure" facility is one with physical attributes that prevent leav-
ing (i.e. locked doors, guards, or barbed wire), but only partially restricts
freedom (for example, allowing individuals to leave during the day but im-
posing a curfew at night).322 "Semi-secure" facilities are not much differ-
ent than U.S. facilities that allow furloughs, depending on the level of re-
striction. For example, Ireland has a semi-secure facility that encourages
application for furloughs of a week or more323-not substantially different
than the ABA's recommendation for US facilities housing detainees with
families. That said, the difference between a "nonsecure" and "semi-
secure" facility is whether the default presumption is detention or not, de-
pending on the individual's behavior.
It is not clear why nonsecure and semi-secure facilities have not been
used in the US, except perhaps tradition. 324 Nor did the ABA or USCIRF
recommend non-secure or semi-secure facilities, perhaps for the same rea-
son. 325 Nonsecure and semi-secure facilities would be a marked departure
316 ABA Standards, supra note 25, at § II.C n. 1., p. 4.
317 FLYNN, supra note 33, at 23; see also Hernandez, supra note 21, at 1407-08 (discussing
Flynn).
318 FLYNN, supra note 33, at 23.
319 FLYNN at 21-23.
320 Id. at 18.
321 Liesbeth Schockaert, Alternatives to detention: open family units in Belgium, 44 FORCED
MIGRATION REVIEW 52 (2013), available at http://www.fmreview.org/detention/schockaert.
322 Id. at 22.
323 Id. at 23.
324 Cf McLeod, supra note 19, at 152 (blaming the "entrenched crime-centered institutional cul-
ture of criminal-immigration enforcement" for making civil detention reform unattainable).
325 See USCIRF, supra note 11, at 1 (recommending asylum seekers be housed only in "civil facil-
ities"); ABA Standards, supra note 25, at § II.C n. 1., p. 4. Notably, the ABA's recommended continu-
um of supervision omitted nonsecure and semi-secure facilities, skipping directly from home arrest to
detention. Id.
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from current practices. Currently, ICE operates a fairly binary incarcera-
tion-or-not system, with nearly half a million detained each year, all in se-
cure facilities, 326 and only about 22,000 supervised in alternatives to deten-
tion. Under current law, ICE could build nonsecure and semi-secure
facilities and employ them to house most of its current detainees, with the
potential exception of detainees in expedited removal, which might require
regulatory reinterpretation. 327 Doing so would dramatically change the na-
ture of the US detention system, and likely tailor liberty restrictions better
to actual risks.
Were such a system of civil custody and supervision implemented-with
less, shorter, and a different nature of detention, when used-it might en-
gender differing procedural due process analyses for differing deprivations
of liberty. To date, procedural due process doctrine has essentially defined
incarceration as a brightline, equivalent to "confinement," with incarcera-
tion triggering greater protection than lesser deprivations of liberty. 328 The
US does not particularly use nonsecure or semi-secure facilities. And
courts have little considered whether lesser restrictive forms of custody
than confinement, such as electronic monitoring or supervised release,
might trigger lesser procedural protections. 329 In this sense, procedural due
process analysis of civil detention might come to reflect Fourth Amend-
326 Gilman, Realizing Liberty, at 250 & n. 26.
327 Expedited removal provides for "detention," not "custody." Compare 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b)(l)(A)(i)), (B)(iii)(IV) to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Moreover, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(e) provides specific
requirements for noncitizens in expedited removal "taken into Service custody and detained at a facility
other than at a Service Processing Center" (i.e. a Contract Detention Facility or facility operated pursu-
ant to an intergovernmental agreement, many of which are not operated by ICE). The four require-
ments for their detention are "24-Hour supervision, conformance with safety and emergency
codes, food service, and availability of emergency medical care." 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(e)(1-4). The re-
quirement of "24-hour supervision" might preclude a nonsecure or semi-secure facility, although elec-
tronic tracking might meet it.
328 Erin Murphy, Paradigms Of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) (analyzing criminal proce-
dural protections). See also, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) ("[Clommitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.") (citing
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (The Court, in
describing juvenile detention, stated, "It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical
meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the
matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is
an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time."); see also
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1981) (focusing on "defendant's interest in person-
al freedom") (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) ("actual imprisonment is a penalty dif-
ferent in kind")).
329 See Ortega v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 737 F.3d 435 (6th Cir.
2013) (considering whether individual, subject to home confinement with electronic monitoring, had
liberty interest against being transferred to jail pursuant to an ICE detainer. "A prison cot is not the
same as a bed, a cell not the same as a home, from every vantage point: privacy, companionship, com-
fort.... What process is due will vary from setting to setting..."); See generally Robert Koulish, Enter-
ing the Risk Society: A Contested Terrain for Immigration Enforcement, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 77 (Oct. 2012) (analyzing spectrum of restrictions on liberty imposed by ATD).
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ment case law, which has judicially developed so as to apply a spectrum of
differing standards to differing deprivations of liberty. 330 More broadly, it
may be necessary to more precisely define terms such as "incarceration,"
"detention," "custody," and "supervision" to more accurately reflect the
spectrum of deprivations of liberty that are increasingly employed.33 1
B.The Civil Immigration Detention Reform Movement to Date: Assessing
its Political Impact
Lastly, as a postscript, I summarize the state of the government's imple-
mentation of civil immigration detention reform, and offer thoughts as to
the political viability and impact of the government's efforts.
To date, the government's civil detention reform efforts have stalled. In
2011, ICE planned five civil facilities. 332 One (Karnes) opened, two others
have been blocked by local opposition, and the remaining two still receive
human rights criticism:
*Karnes, TX: Karnes opened in 2012, and has recently been shifted
to house Central American families. 33 3
*Crete, IL: Although ICE selected Crete, IL as a detention center in
2011, political opposition the following year resulted in Crete's
city council withdrawing Crete from consideration. 334 ICE is
now exploring a replacement facility in Hobart, IN, but the city's
mayor has publically "announced his administration will not
support" the immigration center. 335
eSouthwest Ranches, FL: in June 2012 ICE decided to cancel the
planned facility amid opposition by a neighboring city, Pem-
broke Pines. Litigation from the private prison company en-
330 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
331 The debate whether electronic monitoring is an alternative form of detention, or an alternative
to detention, is emblematic. See Kalhan, supra note 24, at 55-56 (arguing that DHS' alternatives to
detention are alternative forms of custody). Lower courts have begun to address these questions. Com-
pare Xiaoyuan Ma v. Holder, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052-55 (N.D. Ca. May 16, 2012) (electronic mon-
itoring constitutes "in custody" for purposes of habeas) with Nguyen v. B.I., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1109,
1114 (D. Or. 2006) ("placement in [electronic monitoring] is not detention").
332 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 10, at 18-19.
333 James Munoz, First illegal immigrants arrive at Karnes County detention center, KENS5
(Aug. 1 2014), http://www.kens5.com/story/news/local/2014/08/01/illegal-immigrants-
arrive/1347648 7/.
334 Naomi Nix, Crete withdraws from detention center consideration, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jun. 12,
2012), available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-crete-withdraws-from-
detention-center-consideration-20120611 -story.html.
335 Elvia Malagon, Hobart Mayor won't back potential immigration detention center, NW.COM
(Apr. 13, 2014), available at http://www.nwitimes.com/news/locallake/hobart/hobart-mayor-won-t-
back-possible-immigration-detention-center/article aa7b 1068-167f-520d-b3e7-3805ad86503b.html.
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sued. 336
-Essex County, NJ: In Essex County, NJ, despite civil reforms at
the private Delaney Hall facility, the facility has been the subject
of major human rights criticism, as to noncompliance with ICE
standards, nonresponse to grievances, verbal abuse and mis-
treatment, and poor medical service, food service, and visita-
tion. 337
*Orange County, CA: Similarly, in Orange County, CA, the NGO
Detention Network Watch in November 2012 released a report,
"Expose and Close," which designated the Theo Lacy facility as
one of the ten worst immigration detention centers in the coun-
try.338
Moreover, a sixth facility, Broward in Florida, was also noted by the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom as feeling "less pe-
nal," and "more appropriate" for asylum seekers. That said, a 2013 Ameri-
cans for Immigrant Justice report detailed issues such as "sexual assault,
substandard medical care, improper isolation, excessive use of force,
abysmal conditions, and the lack of due process." 339
Given this, serious questions remain as to the political viability of the
government's efforts. On one hand, scholars such as David Cole have wor-
ried that the institutionalization in law of civil or preventive detention
might "normalize" its use as the norm, not the exception. 340 Institutionali-
zation in formal standards and physical facilities may further that trend.
Additionally, detention reforms may particularly normalize civil detention
336 Heather Carney, Judge Tosses Lawsuit Against Pembroke Pines Over Southwest Ranches Im-
migration Detention Center, SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/22/cca-lawsuit-pembroke-pines-southwest-
ranches n 2929423.html.
337 Senuteh Freeman and Lauren Major, Immigration Incarceration: The Expansion and Failed
Reform of Immigration Detention in Essex County, NJ, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC 5 (Mar. 2012),
https://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Immigrationlncarceration2l2.pdf; but see
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, STATEMENT OF THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON ASYLUM: CREDIBLE FEAR AND PAROLE
PROCESSES 4 (2013) (calling Delaney Hall "noticeably less penal"), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/USCIRF-statement-asylum-eredible-fear-rev4.pdf.
338 OC's Theo Lacy detention facility among 10 worst in U.S., ACLU (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/ExposeClose/Expose-
TheoLacyl 1-13.pdf.
339 Susan Barciela and Cheryl Little, Broward Transitional Center: A 'Model'for Civil Detention
AMERICANS FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE (March 2013), http://aijustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/BTC-A-Model-for-Civil-Detention.pdf.
340 Cole, Shadows, supra note 28, at 749; see also Rappleye, supra note 194 (quoting Dr. Fred
Berlin, director of Johns Hopkins Sexual Behavior Consultation Unit: existing SVP legislation "is based
on the exception, rather than the rule.");
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by putting a "comfortable face" on it, as Michael Flynn argued; 341 and im-
proved procedural checks such as appointed counsel may amplify that
normalization by reassuring the public that lawyers are present to advocate
for their clients' interests. 342 Essentially, extrapolating the current civil de-
tention model forward, the concern is that the public may perceive deten-
tion as "not really jail," but in any event "fair." 343 Reforms may concur-
rently obscure in the public debate larger policy questions regarding the
cost and morality of large-scale civil preventive detention.
That said, civil detention reform has yet to implement the "comfortable
face" on detention that Flynn worries about. Even if reforms were fully
implemented, "civil" detention appears to be a distinction without a differ-
ence to the public. Both sides of the immigration debate essentially reject
the premise of civil detention reform-i.e. any distinction between civil fa-
cilities such as Karnes and criminal prisons.
Pro-immigrant advocates have objected to immigration detention on civil
grounds writ large.344 For example, subsequent to Karnes' opening, local
activists and immigrant advocates in Illinois and Florida called the new civ-
il facilities "prisons" and forced ICE to change its plans. 345
On the other hand, restrictionists have objected to the supposedly prefer-
ential conditions given to noncitizens over criminal defendants. In 2012,
the House Judiciary Committee Chair held a hearing called "Holiday on
ICE," at which he and others criticized ICE's new standards as providing
341 MICHAEL FLYNN, ON THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION ON
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (Mar. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/publications/FlynnDiscussion-Paper-v4.pdf; Mi-
chael Flynn & Michelle Brane, Does making immigration detention more humane make it more wide-
spread? NEW INTERNATIONALIST MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2014), http://newint.org/features/web-
exclusive/2014/01/01/detention-humane-widespread/. Even alternatives to detention may help normal-
ize methods of social control based on risk management tools. Koulish, supra note 47, at 4.
342 See Section IV.B.
343 Notably, this concern may be a long time away from fruition. Indeed, the recent facility that
the U.S. built in Artesia, NM to house Central American families has already been criticized and sued
for poor conditions and poor access to counsel. Julia Preston, U.S. Faces Suit Over Tactics at Immi-
grant Detention Center, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/201 4/08/23/us/us-faces-suit-over-tactics-at-immigrant-detention-
center.html? r=0.
344 Rep. Gallegly: "Numerous statements issued by the [immigrant] advocates make clear they are
opposed to the immigration detention in and of itself." Holiday on ICE: The U.S. Department of Home-
land Security's New Immigration Standards: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy
and Enforcement of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 112 Cong. 2 (2012),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/ 12th/I 12-104_73543.PDF;
345 Amy Sherman, Opponents of SW Ranches prison protest Wasserman Schultz, MIAMI HERALD,
May 30, 2012, http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2012/05/opponents-of-sw-ranches-prison-
protest-wasserman-schultz-in-aventura.html (quoting Florida Immigrant Coalition Executive Director
Maria Rodriguez: "Latino and immigrant families.., will be hurt by this prison..."); Press Release, Rep.
Jesse Jackson, Jr., Jackson Applauds Crete Board For Deep-Sixing Prison (June 12, 2012), available at
http://iackson.house.gov/index.php?option=com content&task--view&id=552&Itemid=86 ("Crete is a
wonderful small town.... A prison would have changed that image forever").
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preferential jail treatment to illegal immigrants.346 The conflation of de-
tained immigrants with criminals has been clear. For example, Jessica
Vaughn, of the Center for Immigration Studies, stated that "ICE detention
centers were already softer than those at other federal and local [criminal]
facilities," and described the immigration detention population as com-
prised of "criminals," "who have been convicted of a crime," and those
whom "ICE euphemistically refers to as 'non-criminals'." 347
Thus, these sides agree that immigration detention is jail, and merely
disagree on whether immigrants belong there. So far, civil detention re-
form has been a policymakers' movement, not a public movement. This
lack of a political constituency may affect the long-term viability of reform,
and moot Flynn's concerns. 348
Conclusion
To date, U.S. civil immigration detention reform has been marked by lit-
tle that is uniquely civil-either regarding impacts on the individual liberty
of detainees, or the expressive message connoted by reformed facilities.
This is true even were reform fully implemented. Ultimately, "truly civil"
detention would likely entail less detention, of shorter duration, and when
used, more often "not detention"-a system of civil custody and supervi-
sion, rather than a system of civil detention. It is possible reforms in that
vein might lead to a transformation of immigration enforcement from mass
detention to mass supervision.349
Most likely, the solution to the increasing numbers of U.S. detainees will
be to change the discourse on immigration enforcement, and take it out of
its crime-centered framework. That, most likely, requires less detention,
not better and better-checked detention.
346 Holiday on ICE: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's New Immigration Standards:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the Committee on the Ju-
diciary, House of Representatives, 112 Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Sen. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H.
Comm. On Immigration) (stating, "Under this Administration, detention looks more like recess."),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/1 12-104 73543.PDF;
347 Holiday on ICE: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's New Immigration Standards:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the Committee on the Ju-
diciary, House of Representatives, 112 Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Jessica Vaughn),
http://judiciary.house.gov/ files/hearings/Hearings%202012Vaughan%2003282012.pdf.
348 These arguments may be reconciled by noting that the actual conditions being reformed appear
to have public impact, while their "civil" label does not. This disconnect between the legal grounds of
civil detention and its public reception suggests a sub rosa expressive quality to preventive incarcera-
tion which I will explore in future research. Because of this expressive quality of preventive incarcera-
tion, it may be politically difficult for ICE to use alternatives to detention, as it is politically difficult for
legislatures to use alternative sanctions to criminal incarceration. See Kahan, supra note 102, at 605-
608.
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